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Journalism of Courage
Two developments relating to India8217;s defence are particularly glaring. One is the country8217;s inability to provide adequate funds for defence and the second is the waning interest of the youth to opt for a career in the armed forces. Both have a direct bearing on the state of our defence preparedness. While certain steps to attract more youth to the defence services have been undertaken with favourable results, it is the financial constraint, which has begun to debilitate the armed forces, that necessitates both immediate and long-term corrective measures.
Despite earnest endeavour of successive governments, it has not been possible for the past few years to provide more than 2.5 percent of the GDP for defence. It is widely accepted that defence needs a sustained allocation of at least 3 to 4 percent of the GDP, particularly in the light of Pakistan spending between 5 and 7 percent of its GDP on defence. Even this year8217;s defence budget, which shows an increase of nearly 15 percent over the previous year, isnot adequate to meet the pressing requirements of the three services. The increase would be offset by the obligations of the Fifth Pay Commission and the prevailing rate of inflation.
Under the circumstances, what should be done? One immediate step should be to ensure that the Army budget is not stretched to include expenditure on counter-insurgency operations, which should be met from the home ministry8217;s budget. This would also ensure that the Army8217;s primary objective is not internal security issues.
One of the logical options which shouldbe considered seriously is the reduction of force levels. This option is also logical in the light of India having acquired the retaliatory nuclear capability, which obliterates the need to defend every inch of the land. From the present strength of 1.1 million, a manpower reduction by 50,000 has already been planned by the Chief of Army Staff, General V.P. Malik.
However, in order to ensure that we don8217;t weaken our military response, while downsising the force levels we should work towards having a highly mobile and mechanised Army with force multipliers. This will mean bringing about certain far-reaching changes in the current deployment pattern. A few years ago, the Army did toy with the idea of dual-tasking some of its formations. It will be interesting to see how the decision works.
We could also go in for more battalions of the Territorial Army TA. This will provide the country additional trained manpower, without having to add to its standing force.
Of course, there are strong arguments againstsuch pruning. But equally cogent are compulsions to reduce due to financial constraints. The services8217; long-term plans have gone haywire. For example, the Army8217;s perspective plan which envisaged mechanisation of all infantry battalions by the year 2000 got relegated to the background. Similarly, the IAF8217;s 15 years Long Term Re-equipment Plan, which envisaged gradual modernisation of its aircraft fleet, has been impaired by financial constraints. Not only should these plans be given fresh thrust, greater importance should be given to electronic and information warfare, which are of paramount importance in today8217;s conflict.
Similarly, the Air Force could look at the prospect of a 10 percent reduction in its aircraft fleet. Of course all this will mean not only modern aircraft for the IAF but also better serviceability of its fleet. Moreover, with the proposed induction of Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles in the Army and the IAF, the role of strike and ground attack aircraft will change considerably.
Asimilar priority should be the hallmark of our naval fleet. Though full details of the Navy8217;s recently prepared Force Level Structure Document are not known, it is reported to have suggested a total of 125 ships with two carrier task forces. The Navy is also proposing to augment its submarine arm by having a minimum force level of 24 submarines. Of course, the type of ships, submarines and reconnaissance systems that will be provided to the Navy will be crucial. An effective and highly mobile Navy is important since India8217;s strategic frontiers cover a very vast sea area 8211; from the Indian Ocean to West Asia, including the South China Sea. Also the Navy8217;s retaliatory or second strike capability in a nuclear environment underlines its heightened role in today8217;s battlefield scenario.
All this calls for a fresh scrutiny by an expert body like the National Security Council, taking into account the gravity of threat not only from the northern and western theatres, but the country8217;s wider role in the geopolitics ofSouth Asia. This will determine the force levels, the strategy, the equipment profile and the training of the defence services for the coming years, in the given financial constraints.
