
Even in a country no stranger to violent mass politics 8212; the Gurjjar and Gorkha agitations being two recent examples 8212; or to communal street politics, the Amarnath agitation is special, and especially dangerous. For in Jammu and Kashmir the costs of an identity-based conflict will be disproportionately high. J038;K must look today like a low-hanging fruit to extremists of all stripes. Islamabad is currently fighting its own many demons, but even so, any nudge-nudge wink-wink from across the border may empower the more adventurous of the 8220;separatist8221; groups in J038;K, and their action would be welcomed by homegrown, self-styled, militant custodians of pilgrims8217; rights. A step-up in the already intense level of conflict may create a perverse connection between a 8220;Jammu and Kashmir8221; problem and 8220;mainstream8221; Indian politics. Kashmir has been a conflict site for decades but seldom an effective rallying point for national mass identity politics. If this were to change, the consequences would be awful.
For these reasons, today8217;s all-party meeting must look at the Amarnath problem as a national question. India has faced big questions on religion/identity issues in the recent past. The Shah Bano case and the Ayodhya agitation are two clear examples, and in both instances the political class failed the country. There are many ways to make a mess of it this time. Some have already been attempted: the original decision on allotting land for pilgrims8217; facilities and the circumstances of its reversal both displayed poor judgment. The original decision didn8217;t, perhaps deliberately, take a reading of the political temperature; the reversal was preceded by irresponsible statements from Valley politicians 8212; 8220;demographic shift8221;, for example 8212; that helped galvanise the current Jammu agitation.