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Journalism of Courage
With the tenth anniversary of Pokharan II now behind us, one political fact stands out. The BJP leadership is so determined to prevent the Congress from gaining credit for the Indo-US nuclear deal that it is prepared to abandon the political inheritance of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who ordered Pokharan II and laid the foundation for India8217;s integration into the global order as a full-fledged nuclear weapon power.
There is no other way of explaining the BJP8217;s decision to dismiss the arguments of two individuals who helped Vajpayee put India on a bold nuclear path. One is Brajesh Mishra, Vajpayee8217;s national security adviser, who planned Pokharan II and managed its consequences. The other is former President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who as head of DRDO organised the nuclear tests along with the Department of Atomic Energy.
Anyone familiar with India8217;s nuclear diplomacy over the last decade knows the Indo-US nuclear deal was merely a culmination of Vajpayee8217;s persistent negotiations with Washington. These talks took place in two phases 8212; between the then external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh, and the then American deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, during 1998-2000 and between Brajesh Mishra and his American counterpart as national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, during 2001-04. The Congress just capped this effort during 2004-05.
The ground for India8217;s nuclear diplomacy was laid on May 13, 1998, when Vajpayee announced the second round of Pokharan II and a moratorium on further testing of nuclear weapons. Vajpayee understood nuclear defiance was not an end in itself; it must be followed by reconciliation. He recognised the urgency of finding an accommodation with the global nuclear order and reclaiming India8217;s access to civil nuclear energy.
Without Vajpayee clearing the underbrush, there was no way that Manmohan Singh could have clinched an agreement with the US that liberates India from three and a half decades of nuclear bondage.
A true celebration of the tenth anniversary of Pokharan II would have involved the demonstration of national unity on implementing the remaining steps of the Indo-US civil nuclear initiative. As our political classes quarrel, public focus has largely been on the Communist opposition to a nuclear deal.
While CPM General Secretary Prakash Karat8217;s threat to pull the plug on the government is the proximate cause for the current nuclear stalemate, it is Advani8217;s opposition to the nuclear deal that takes one8217;s breath away. That the CPM might want to dismantle India8217;s civilian and military nuclear programmes does not surprise anyone familiar with the tragic history of the Indian communist movement.
Having never been part of India8217;s mainstream national security thinking, the CPM is free to take outrageous positions. After all Karat attacked Pokharan II as a sellout to the United States, at a time when the Clinton administration was imposing sanctions on India and mobilising the rest of the world to punish Vajpayee8217;s defiance of the international system. It may be surreal but not shocking that Karat thinks the nuclear deal which fully reverses American position in 1998 is also a sellout to Washington.
But the current nuclear positions of the BJP 8212; which ruled India for six years, made it a full-fledged nuclear weapon power and took the diplomatic initiative to end its long atomic isolation 8212; must necessarily be judged by a different yardstick.
In his recent criticism of the UPA government, the BJP leader L.K. Advani reminded us how Vajpayee was the first to congratulate Prime Minister Indira Gandhi when she conducted India8217;s first nuclear test, Pokharan I, 34 years ago this month. Reflect a little on this statement, and you see the difference between Advani and Vajpayee.
In 1974, when Indira Gandhi8217;s popularity was at an ebb, many, including the communists, attacked Pokharan I as a malevolent attempt to divert attention from the many domestic threats to her regime. In felicitating Mrs Gandhi, Vajpayee demonstrated his readiness to put national interest above his own and those of his party, then known as Jan Sangh.
If he had chosen to follow Vajpayee8217;s example, Advani would be rooting for the nuclear deal and not letting his party oppose it in the manner it has. India had always enjoyed a measure of bipartisanship on core national security concerns. In the last few years, the two national parties 8212; the Congress and BJP 8212; had pursued similar policies on a range of issues from Jammu and Kashmir to nuclear weapons, from the boundary dispute with China to reclaiming India8217;s role in Asia.
Vajpayee continued the policies of Nehru, who founded India8217;s independent nuclear programme, Indira Gandhi, who conducted Pokharan I, and Rajiv Gandhi, who ordered the weaponisation of India8217;s civil nuclear programme. Much like Vajpayee, who took advantage of the preparations for nuclear tests by the Narasimha Rao government, it was the turn of Manmohan Singh to reap the rewards of BJP8217;s creative nuclear diplomacy.
Instead of building on this record of nuclear bipartisanship, Advani, sadly, has allowed the BJP to reject the nuclear deal. In refusing to rise to the occasion, the BJP has tailed an anti-nuclear CPM and forsaken its claim as a consistent champion of India8217;s national security interests. It8217;s a pity that the BJP is disowning the nuclear legacy of its tallest leader, Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
The writer is a Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore iscrmohanntu.edu.sg
