How to fight corruption

Not just about money

Of course corruption is sustained by the allure of material gain. But the psychology and sociology behind corruption is more complex. Corruption is seen as a means of social empowerment. In a society like ours, where the equal moral worth of individuals is rarely affirmed, one of the ways in which people affirm their own worth is by being able to exercise discretionary power over others. Corruption is as much about the allure of power as it is about money, and the intensity of competitive frenzy for power in this society is largely due to the fact that without power, your moral worth will not be affirmed. Corruption is a form of exercising that power.

Second, one of the peculiar features of Indian society has been that politics is the area of greatest social mobility, almost more than any other. We think it is a great tribute to our democracy that we cannot answer the question as to who governs India by pointing to a small social elite. It is through politics and the capture of state power that social mobility has been produced. Is there any sphere of activity that is less stratified by class and caste than politics? But one of the consequences is that the capture of state power by particular groups is meant to enhance and solidify the social mobility of members of those groups. State patronage is justified on this view because it has been the primary means of bringing about social mobility. Big scams like Bofors and Tehelka do not tell you the real story of the relationship between corruption and social mobility. It is the thousands of small fortunes that officials from tehsildars to constables, from mid-level clerks to petty contractors, are making that has allowed them to escape the ravages of their class and solidify the fortunes of their next generation.

Indeed, even in the petrol pump scam, it is striking that the number of beneficiaries include not the rich and powerful but people who have risen through the ranks of politics. All this is not to justify corruption, but to suggest that its widespread legitimacy comes from a deeper source: we have seen the state as the dominant means of achieving social mobility or maintaining it, and its resources are being directly used to achieve just that.

Democratic practice

Corruption is democratised in two senses. One of the more interesting changes in the institutionalisation of corruption has been that the discretionary exemptions for the powerful are diminishing. In the state where I currently reside, Haryana, literally ever single transaction with the State involves what the locals call 8216;8216;the Chautala tax8217;8217;. And it is proving difficult for the rich and powerful to escape side payments. Earlier, if you knew the manager of the local telephone company, you did not have to pay the line-man, or if you knew the Chief Secretary, the tehsildar would show mercy. Not so anymore. The local line-man will challenge you to get the manager down to fix the phone line himself, and the tehsildar will act regardless of status when it comes to demanding payments, except for the smallest of coteries. Corruption is becoming less beholden to privilege and status. We may not be equal before the law but we are when it comes to having to pay up.

Second, in states like Haryana, there is first-hand evidence that the spoils are being shared in precise ways from peons who handles files to senior politicians. Corruption has become more genuinely participatory.

Poor worst sufferers

The really debilitating and socially destructive forms of corruption are the corruption that the poor face: the hawkers, the rickshaw-pullers, the small tea-shop owners valiantly trying to earn a living against all odds. State officials extract as much from them and with as much impunity as possible. In public consciousness we excessively privilege the big scams. Our moral wrath is directed at spectacular malfeasance, not the daily insidious grind through which corruption puts vulnerable people.

Probes to blame too

While vigilance against and exposure of corrupt politicians and government servants is absolutely necessary, the forms corruption investigations can take can be counter-productive. The net result of the years of Bofors investigations was, in retrospect, that it made purchases of new Defence systems inordinately treacherous. The fear of being implicated leads more often to non-action than correct action. Investigate and find out the number of key decisions on procurement that have not been taken because officials are too wary of signing anything that might lead them to be investigated. This fear is justified because our investigating agencies can be trusted to harass the innocent more than they apprehend the guilty. Until our investigating agencies are in good shape, we must be prepared not only for the prospect that few sustainable indictments will be issued, but also that investigations hamper government functioning as much as they clean them up. Any guesses now on how long it might take to reallocate the petrol pumps fairly?

Privatisation no solution

There are good independent arguments for privatising many of the state8217;s economic functions. But it is premature to think that the amount of undeserved rents collected by state officials will decline tremendously as a result. This is not because there might be corruption involved in the process of privatisation; it is simply that that quantum of rents the state can still collect will dwarf anything the PSUs bring in.

The extent of how inventive the state can be in collecting rents and turning rights into discretion can be gauged by one trivial example. In Haryana you are required to pay cash to buy stamp paper. Because the amounts involved are large, you have to pay a government official to count the money that you are giving to the state. In any case, even with relentless privatisation, enough ways of making money through the state will be left intact. Privatisation alone will change only the structure of rents, not diminish their volumes.

Diminishing corruption will require both changing norms and institutions of enforcement, neither of which are likely to change in the near future. Tackling corruption will require more than just shaming politicians. It will require changing the social hierarchies, social norms and the structure of incentives for politicians, officials and citizens alike. Till then corruption will remain an infallible symptom of the kinds of social relations our society produces. Exposure and moralism alone will not do.

The writer is a Professor of Philosophy and of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University