Grab the moment

The DAE says it would have four commercial breeder reactors of 500 MW each contributing to India8217;s power supply in 2020.

Just one nuclear power station with two imported 1000 MW reactors would achieve the same objective, more simply and quickly. But isn8217;t the DAE all for self-reliance, not imports?

DAE8217;s own nuclear power strategy involves the import of six large-sized reactors besides the two 1000 MW reactors it is building with Russian cooperation in Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu, to meet its target of 20,000 MW. Together these imported reactors would contribute 8000 MW to the 20,000 MW projection of the DAE 8212; or 40 per cent of the total. It is this 40 per cent that the DAE calls an 8220;additionality8221; to indigenously developed nuclear power capacity.

To be able to import nuclear reactors or fuel, India would first have to implement the nuclear pact with the US. If the nuclear deal falls apart because of the DAE8217;s determination to keep the PFBR outside safeguards, the simple truth is that the DAE will not be able to import the six reactors it wants to in the next 15 years.

Without those six reactors, DAE8217;s contribution to the power sector would be 14,000 MW in 2020, a truly minuscule amount. This could further come down if the Tarapur reactors have to be shut down because there8217;s no imported enriched uranium fuel and indigenously built reactors confront a shortage of natural uranium supplies.

By 2020 China, which started a civilian nuclear programme two decades after India, would have 36,000 MW of nuclear power. The DAE is prepared to risk a rapid shrinking of India8217;s nuclear power programme just because it wants to keep the PFBR outside safeguards. It is even more incredible for the DAE to ask the nation to wait until 2040 to see breeders becoming the mainstay of India8217;s nuclear power programme.

Once the global nuclear rules are changed in favour of India, which is the principle purpose of the nuclear pact with the US, the DAE would be able to import as many reactors as it can absorb in the coming years.

Those who raise the bogey of US pressure obfuscate the reality that India badly needs a change of rules to facilitate a significant contribution from nuclear power. Any deal involves give and take and the question before the political leadership is whether the DAE demands on the breeder are reasonable.

DAE8217;s obsession with the breeder programme is understandable only as an R038;D venture with some future potential. By no measure can it be defined as central to India8217;s energy security. India must maintain the programme as an important R038;D option, which could translate into a reality two decades from now.

The suggestion that breeders would contribute to India8217;s weapons programme is even stranger. The PFBR would sharply reduce the current availability of unsafeguarded plutonium for weapons purposes. The breeder by definition produces more plutonium than it consumes. In the short-term though, India8217;s PFBR would first eat up nearly 7-8 tonnes of unsafeguarded plutonium before it starts producing more. India is believed to have around 10 tonnes of unsafeguarded plutonium. The initial charge for the fast breeder reactors could be anywhere around 3-4 tonnes. And it would need a similar amount to be kept in reserve for various contingencies.

Persisting with an unsafeguarded breeder programme would siphon off nearly 80 per cent of valuable unsafeguarded plutonium from the military programme to what is clearly an experimental programme. The political leadership would want to know why in the world would the DAE want to do that.

If India needs more plutonium for its weapons programme, which in itself is a questionable proposition, there are cheaper and simpler technological options available within a credible plan that separates India8217;s civilian and military nuclear facilities. Using a breeder reactor to produce plutonium for weapons is like using an F-16 fighter aircraft to squat a fly.

There are occasional hints that the breeder is related to some special research on thorium reactors. By all accounts, thorium-based power generation is at least three decades away. To sacrifice current power generation in the name of a thorium future makes no economic sense.

So long as the DAE insists that the breeder reactor cannot be put under safeguards, India8217;s list of civilian nuclear facilities will remain embarrassingly short. Since the DAE wants to leave the PFBR outside safeguards, it would also need to keep all the civilian power reactors which feed unsafeguarded spent fuel into it. Without the PBFR, it is impossible for India to present a serious programme of nuclear separation to the international community. Without such a plan, there would be no Indo-US pact nor a change in the global nuclear regime in favour of India. Then, India would have less plutonium available for the weapons programme and less nuclear power without the planned import of reactors.

Rather than keeping the breeder programme out of international safeguards, the DAE should be demanding that the government negotiate two important concessions from the US in return for putting the PFBR on the civilian list.

One: a guaranteed supply of plutonium for the PFBR. Two: a commitment to give the DAE a slice of the US-Russian plan to recycle plutonium for international markets and build a new generation of reactors.

DAE8217;s passion for breeders would be more realistic if India embarks on global cooperation in the development of plutonium technologies. This opportunity, which did not exist due to the sanctions of the past few decades, is now a serious one amidst the US decision to unveil a new initiative on global nuclear energy partnership.

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