Did the dog learn French?

There is a story that has much relevance nowadays. It goes that a philosopher who had annoyed one of the autocratic Russian czars was ord...

There is a story that has much relevance nowadays. It goes that a philosopher who had annoyed one of the autocratic Russian czars was ordered to be executed immediately. The philosopher8217;s friends in the court pleaded for mercy on his behalf. After much pleading, the czar offered a bargain to the philosopher, quot;Your execution will be stayed for six months if you agree to teach my dog to speak in French. If he does, you will be spared. If not, the sentence will be carried out.quot; When the philosopher accepted this impossible condition with alacrity, his friends were dismayed. They could not understand his happiness at what seemed to them to be a mere postponement of the inevitable. The philosopher, articulating historical randomness well before the Theory of Uncertainty had been propounded, explained his action, quot;In six months, many things can happen. I can die. The czar can die. Or, who knows, the dog may indeed learn French.quot;

It is quite obvious that Indian ministers, policy makers and security advisors arenot like that philosopher. They cannot calculate their actions on the basis of uncertainty. If that were not so, they would not have rushed ahead to fill their pens with ink in order to be ready to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTBT at the slightest signal from Uncle Sam. In the event, they have not had to rush in to act. However, the reason is not to be attributed either to far-sightedness or courage on their part. It is because the dog learnt French: the US Senate itself decided not to ratify the CTBT, thereby making it possible for Indian diplomats to paste temporary smirks on their faces and to gloat that their stand has been vindicated.

Which stand? Surely not the one taken a few years ago by the Indian representative who declared unequivocally, quot;We will not sign the CTBT. Not now. Not ever.quot; Much water flowed down the Potomac since that brave statement and only a few weeks ago there was much mumbling by those who determine security policy about quot;building a national consensusquot; so that Indiacould put its mark on the CTBT without too much discord in the political class. Thus, while stands do shift in diplomacy, it is important for the spokesmen of the government to state which stand of India has been vindicated by the dog speaking in French in the US Senate: the one of active resistance or the one of acquiescence. It is necessary to do so also because, whatever may have happened in the Senate, the US President 8212; revered by Indian policy makers as the most powerful man on earth 8212; has by no means forgotten his native tongue. Even after the vote in the Senate, he held out a severe warning in plain English to India and Pakistan too regarding nuclear testing. The fact is that security policy cannot be built on a post-facto basis, in response to developments elsewhere. Nor can it be premised on the principle of act now, think later8217;. The government of India, the framers of its policies and the nomenclature that comprise the National Security Council have given enough indication that there has notbeen sufficient consideration of pros and cons before decisions are taken.

Take the case of the peremptory manner in which nuclear tests were carried out in Pokharan principally to earn a domestic political brownie point. It not only uncorked the bottle in which the nuclear genie had been secured since 1974 but it also led to a great deal of unnecessary 8212; and indeed unrealistic 8212; chest thumping by leaders who should have known better. The home minister8217;s immature gloating at Pakistan, the then tourism minister8217;s invitation to Pakistan quot;to select a time and placequot; for final confrontation, even the Prime Minister8217;s unfortunate letter to the US President offering the excuse of a threat from China as post-facto reason for carrying out the tests did not bring any positive gains for India. They only created avoidable problems with China and provoked Pakistan into carrying out tit-for-tat tests which put nuclear weapons at the very centre of the unstable polity in that country.

The results of the nuclear chainreaction are now plain to see. If seasoned politicians like L. K. Advani could not resist the macho thrill of flexing the nuclear muscle, the fragile Pakistani polity made up of mufassil politicians beholden to the military and the mutually competitively aggressive military brass could hardly be expected to deal with the sudden revelation of the nuclear power with maturity. The ill-considered nuclear explosions in Pokharan made India pay a heavy price not only in terms of the effects of the sanctions imposed on it but also on account of the tremendous pressure it came under to cede autonomy in formulating its security and foreign policy, notably with regard to CTBT but also in many other domains of sovereignty, economic as well as political. Also, in addition to increasing the threat to the subcontinent of the use of these terrible weapons of mass destruction 8212; a development which decreased rather than increase security 8212; the nuclear machismo only meant that the bomb also became plaything of the unstableand already militaristic Pakistani elite.

Indeed, Pakistan has been even more affected by those explosions in May 1998. For one, it put the country8217;s economy under severe strain, making it lead a hand-to-mouth existence dependent on doles from the IMF on the one side and fundamentalist Islamicists on the other. This was a sure situation for resentment to build up against the IMF-fronted imposition of quot;democracy, rule of law, free market, etc.quot; on Pakistan and for choice 8212; albeit unthinking and ultimately suicidal 8212; to be made in favour of military-led Talibanisation.

It is inexplicable how the Indian ruling set is so smug about the outcome of the CTBT vote in the US Senate. The coincidence of the coup in Pakistan, the exposure of the fact that the Taliban element has acquired greater power in the process, the fact that the moral authority of India as a functioning democracy when compared with Pakistan8217;s penchant for dictatorships has been lost on account of the two being put on par on the nuclear issue,the fact also that India continues to remain under US pressure on more issues than one 8212; all these should make ministers, mandarins in the external affairs ministry, security advisors and the nomenclature pause to think about the implications rather than issue smug statements.

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Meanwhile, before announcing his intention of surrendering on the insurance front quot;within three days of taking officequot;, the finance minister too could have considered the possibility of the dog there too barking in French.