
With Sheikh Hasina8217;s Awami League-led coalition winning more than three quarters of the total seats in the parliamentary polls, Bangladesh has reason enough to celebrate 8212; not just its return to democracy but also the victory of the alliance with the more forward-looking agenda. As we hope the ninth parliament will mark a break with Bangladesh8217;s traditionally corruption-ridden, factious politics, India also appears to have reason enough to feel relieved. Hasina8217;s 1996-2001 tenure saw the best bilateral relations with India. And to the extent that history provides a key to what lies ahead, Indian hopes may not be altogether belied this time round either.
It makes a lot of sense, however, to look to the future instead of the past. Apart from the politics of it all, India8217;s relations with the new democratic regime in Bangladesh will hinge on the twin and linked concerns of the economy and energy security. India8217;s concerns about energy security are pronounced; and Bangladesh happens to sit on a wealth of natural gas that its governments have hesitated to export, mindful of the consistent downgrading of the estimated reserves by energy experts. Even then, it appears to have proven reserves of about 5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, good enough for export. Incidentally, at the behest of Russia, the energy ministers of the largest natural-gas exporting countries have just met in Moscow and a 8220;gas OPEC8221; may indeed be on the cards, a development which might further jeopardise international energy security. A 8220;friendly8221; regime to the east may also breathe life into India8217;s moribund gas projects in Myanmar. India has for a while flaunted its 8220;Look East8221; policy, but has little to show for the rhetoric. It lost Myanmarese gas to China last year. But the Shwe gas reserves are still significant for our energy needs. Thus, India and Bangladesh need to revive and rework the tri-nation pipeline project, which should naturally be routed through Bangladesh since bypassing the eastern neighbour would immensely add to the costs. Bangladesh had previously refused to accept India8217;s transit fee offer and stuck to the conditions it had laid down: reduction of the bilateral trade imbalance, transit for hydroelectricity from Nepal and Bhutan through India and a trading corridor for Bangladeshi exports to the two Himalayan states.
India and Bangladesh also stand to gain from Indian investment in Bangladesh. This too is a story that needs to be re-scripted. Earlier this year, the Tata Group was compelled to shelve its investment plans of 3 billion in assorted projects in Bangladesh, having failed to get the government8217;s approval, blamed mostly on the political situation. But tied to this was also the Tatas8217; failure to procure an assured gas supply for the projects. Perhaps a democratically rejuvenated Bangladesh will mark the beginning of change. After all, Bangladesh is also the best maritime gateway for India8217;s Northeast.