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Journalism of Courage
It has been articulated that the nuclear tests at Pokharan have given the country nuclear deterrence. Were this that simple, then even the 1974 test would have classified India as a nuclear weapon power. But it was not so at that time and is not entirely accurate today also. What our scientists and engineers have displayed is our ability to build and explode nuclear devices but those devices have not yet been married to airplanes or to surface-to-surface missiles SSMs that could carry them to the target. It is like having invented gun powder but not having yet made the bullet or the shell which could be fired from a gun. Under these circumstances, the gun powder is not threat and therefore no deterrent.
There have been statements that our nuclear capability has been created as a deterrence to meet the challenges in the country8217;s security environment. Deterrence, like beauty, is in the eyes of the beholder. It has to be recognised as such in the mind of the country being deterred. Therefore, fordeterrence to be viable and work in the calculations of the adversary, it has to have the following ingredients. There has to be demonstrated capability to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary, and there has to be a recognised political will or intention to exercise that capacity.
The deterrent weapons must be securely inplace. They must be visible, i.e. known to all adversaries, and there has to be appropriate infrastructure for their use, including fail-safe communications and mechanisms with back-ups for control by the country8217;s chief executive from his Operations Command Post OCP right down to the flight line and bases for launch of the nuclear weapon fighters and missiles.
A likely threat to our nuclear facilities would be the Pakistani missile the Ghauri or the Chinese SSMs such as the CSS series. Against these SSMs we have, at present, no known defences. We have no anti-ballistic weapon system to counter the missile in its terminal phase. For terminal defence one would need an anti-ballistic missile ABM. In the Gulf War the US used the Patriot ABMs to shoot down the Iraqi Scud SSMs. But, post-war analysis leaves doubt about the efficacy of this ABM. However, one can be sure that, if tasked, Abdul Kalam and his team would be able to design and produce our own indigenous and effective ABM.
In the utilisation ofAir Power, a basic tenet is quot;offensive actionquot;. It would be logical, therefore, that right at the commencement of hostilities, or in pre-emptive action, the Ghauri and the SSMs in Tibet, their installations and infrastructure be destroyed or damaged to make them unusable. To do so, there has to be full and continuous intelligence on the location, movement and the installation of the SSMs along with their command and control links and organisation, as also the same for the nuclear weapon aircraft. What is most important is that there should be real time intelligence with Air HQ in peace time and with the OCP whenever it is activated. Concurrently, the Indian Air Force will have to draw up its own strike plans.
Finally, no system can function effectively without carefully considered strategies and doctrines for the use of these weapons of mass destruction. For deterrence to be in force it has to be believed to be effective in terms of hardware, and there has to be, in conjunction,a displayed determination touse the assets if necessary. After all, the basic need for a deterrent is not to fight wars but to prevent wars.
The writer is a retired air vice-marshal
