Creative coalitionism

The political culture of the Congress reflects its predatory character. Its growth depends on the decline of smaller parties. Politicalrealities are also unfavourable for its entering into alliances. It is stronger largely in those states where practically a two-party system is operative. In Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Delhi, it competes with the BJP, in Kerala and Tripura with the Left front and in Andhra Pradesh with the Telugu Desam Party. The emergence of the third force costs the Congress heavily as it could happen in the case of Bihar, UP, West Bengal, Karnataka or Tamil Nadu.

Its prospective allies have to face unique political dilemma. They are bound to counter it locally and support it at the Centre. It is miserably placed in UP and Bihar, which together have 139 Lok Sabha seats. Hence its prime effort is to win back its old social base and constituencies, like the minorities, Scheduled Castes, tribals and backward classes.

The state of political heterogeneity, however, benefits the BJP. Unlike the Congress, the BJP could adjust itself to the coalitional culture. In 1967, its predecessor, the Jana Sangh, shared powerwith the CPI and Socialists in SVD governments in nine states. In 1971, it formed the Grand Alliance with the Congress(O), Swatantra Party and others. In 1983, it entered into an alliance with Charan Singh’s Lok Dal in a National Democratic Alliance.

Two factors make the BJP the fulcrum of coalitional politics. First, wider acceptance of its prime ministerial candidate, Atal Behari Vajpayee, who has become a rallying point for allies. Secondly, the BJP has horizontally no clash of interest with regional parties. It is a junior partner in Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, AP and Orissa. Moreover, its reconciliatory and accommodative credentials have been proved by protracted alliances with the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, the Akali Dal in Punjab, and the Samata in Bihar.

The need for stability impelled the BJP and its allies to look for stabilising elements through a joint manifesto. Thus a filter system would operate in manifesto-making which will exclude issues, characterised by a zero sum game for the alliancepartners, that are incompatible with the least common ideological denominator (LeCID). The principle of chemistry that individual chemical property of a matter is different from the collective properties is also applicable to the pre-poll alliance.

The smaller the LeCID, the greater the ideological, social and political heterogeneity in the alliance. The BJP’s flexibility is not ideological opportunism. In Western democracies, parties with dissimilar ideologies and social bases have cooperated with one another. The Dutch Labour Party abandoned its traditional republican and pacifist attitude and became part of the system of governing parties. In Italy, the Communist Party joined the National Solidarity government. In Ireland, the conservative party, Fine Gael, joined hands with the Labour Party in coalition formation.

The coalitional politics has obliterated the Right-Left schism and the secularism-minorityism dichotomy. The BJP’s initiative for ideological harmonisation has worked as a catalyst for aconstellation of forces. The party represents an alternative perspective on some cardinal issues like the Indian nationality, secularism, national security, women and language. Once issues like Article 370, temple construction, cow slaughter and the Uniform Civil Code are omitted from the agenda, it becomes easier for the party to demolish Nehruvian perspective of nationality and secularism. The first principle is to correct the aberration of the state policy which found expression in education system, cultural policies and minorityism.

The Hindutva movement would continue its mass indoctrination. The cultural agenda of the movement cannot and should not be imposed from above. It must be generated from below through a resurgence of the Hindu mind. A cultural rejuvenation would force political parties to change their beliefs, attitudes and slogans. During the Janata Party regime, the Sangh faced immense pressure to merge with that party’s youth wing.

However, the proposal was instantly rejected by theRSS. Ideological acceptance of the Sangh Parivar increased. It has virtually brought politics closer to its agenda. Not only George Fernandes and the Samata but Mulayam Singh and his party have also shown their disillusionment with `spurious secularism’, as it was termed by Samajwadi Party general secretary Amar Singh.

The Jana Sangh’s pledge to create `a brave new India’ has been partially fulfilled during the 14 months of BJP rule. The government has made progress in giving a nationalist tone to the education and defence policies of the country. The Swadeshi ideology has found legitimate place in the economics of the government. The BJP-led alliance has made a qualitative output. It has increasingly encouraged integrative and centripetal tendencies in socio-cultural life via coalitional politics. The resolution of the Cauvery water dispute substantiates it. The once anti-Hindi and somewhat Tamil-chauvinist DMK has now become the party’s ally.

Thus, the BJP has turned politics into a creative art andworks of creative art are not programmed. It has learnt to manage contradictions at the periphery and strengthen its position at the centre.

The neo-liberalism of the BJP is a new phase in its political landscape. It can be defined as an effort to broaden its social support base in order to effectively fill the space created by the Congress. In this process, it has certainly made a drift from a micro-level cultural agenda to a macro-level nationalist paradigm. The latter tends to build a society regulated by a state with strong capabilities as against the Congress model based on a strong market sector. Thus, the paradigm would help to win the middle class of the post-liberalisation phase, which favours a strong state.

The writer is a senior lecturer in political science in Delhi University