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Journalism of Courage
The 8216;Malabar-20078217; joint naval exercise in Bay of Bengal, which begins today, is India8217;s largest exercise of this kind yet and involves 24 ships from four countries: Australia, Japan, Singapore and the US. It is taking place fairly soon after the April 2007 exercises with the US and Japan in the western Pacific, which had raised a storm in Beijing. While China8217;s political establishment has sought explanations through diplomatic channels, there is a stir in the Chinese media as well, with some news reports suggesting that 8220;an Asian NATO8221; is imminent. The title of a vernacular press report, when translated into English, reads, 8216;India reminds the Chinese Navy: If you want to enter Indian Ocean, first seek India8217;s permission!8217;
So what precisely is the underlying rationale of New Delhi participating in such exercises? Maritime order and stability in the Indian Ocean, besides being a prerequisite for economic development in the region, is closely linked with this country8217;s security. Additionally, India8217;s vital interests are rapidly expanding even beyond the Indian Ocean. While New Delhi continues to look West for much of its trade and energy imports, its economic stakes in the East, including those with China, are growing. At the same time, there is growing insecurity in Asian waters. The threat of terrorism is assuming graver proportions as indeed maritime crimes like piracy.
Joint exercises constitute a means to build inter-operability and evolve common standard operating procedures SOP between two military forces, so that their assets can be used in a complementary fashion in adverse contingencies. When the tsunami occurred in December 2004, for instance, the naval forces of the countries in the region had to work together. Exercises with technologically advanced countries also help to fill capability voids. This applies both to China and to India. An exercise provides a 8216;near-combat8217; environment necessary to assess the worthiness of potential acquisitions.
India began to conduct joint exercises in the early nineties, beginning with Southeast Asian countries. However, the imperatives of the post-Cold War security scenario compelled it to expand these bilateral linkages to the US, China, Japan and Australia. Although 8216;Malabar-20078217; will be India8217;s 13th exercise with the US, it will be the second with Japan, and only the first with Australia. Significantly, the navies of India and China have already conducted three exercises since 2003, although their scope was different. For example, in contrast to the complex Indo-US exercises involving carrier operations, the Sino-Indian exercises were pitched at a basic level search and rescue, communication drills and so on. Contrary to the common perception this difference is not due so much to the level of trust prevailing between the two sides as much as to other factors like familiarity achieved in past exercises, the take-off level and, most essentially, commonality of language for communications.
The relatively large participation in 8216;Malabar 20078217; is therefore attributable to factors such as these. The focus of this exercise is to respond to sea-line security, which is very critical in the area due to high incidence of piracy. In fact, there is a widespread fear that the increasing violence and better coordination among the miscreants involved in pirate attacks may be a precursor to maritime terrorism, particularly in the Straits of Malacca. And therein lies a potential for security cooperation between India and China as well, considering the convergence in terms of security and navigational safety in the Straits. There could be other avenues as well, like disaster relief and UN operations. Sino-Indian military exercises are therefore necessary not only to foster inter-operability but also as a confidence-building measure.
The writer is with the IDSA, Delhi
