
With its constant rain, clinging mists and chill, Sita village doesn8217;t betray its proximity to the sweltering plains that host Myanmar. Nineteen km from Tegnoupal sub-division HQ in the densely forested Chandel district, and then around 40 km to Moreh down the NH-39, Sita has seen military presence since World War II, when the British forces had set up a camp here. Sita has seen violence too when Naga militants killed six people and burnt this Kuki village down in 1993 during the Naga-Kuki clashes.
The village, since rebuilt, is now playing a key role in maintaining the peace, as an interesting union between the Indian security forces and the Kuki National Army KNA attempts to plug crossover routes of Manipuri insurgents trying to enter Chandel from Myanmar and proceed to the Valley. For, apart from Indian military, the village hosts a KNA camp, with heavily-armed cadre patrolling the area.
And even as the Centre gears up for joint-inspection exercises, and possible joint ops with Myanmar for action on rebel camps across the international border, the Suspension Of Operations agreement between the Kuki militants and the Indian army is proving to be beneficial for both sides.
Senior defence authorities, on conditions of anonymity, told The Sunday Express that the security forces are now using the KNA as scouts and for intelligence gathering about the movements of Valley-based militants crossing over from Myanmar. The Army has entered into a SOO agreement with several tribal militant groups since January this year, including the KNA.
The KNA warn us about possible ambushes, tax-collection drives and infiltration by other militant groups. Under the SOO, they are not supposed to roam around openly with arms, and to their credit, they have abided by the SOO preconditions,8221; an Army source says.
The major factor that has made the KNA useful to the security forces in the area is the policy of the Kuki militants themselves. According to Thangboi Haokip, commander, wing No 5 of the KNA with around 50 per cent of Chandel district under his jurisdiction, the Kukis have no issues with anyone, unless they are agressing Kukis. Much of the KNA cadres hail from Kachin state in Myanmar, where they are fighting for a separate homeland. Interestingly, there have been no reported skirmishes between Indian security forces and KNA.
8220;We are defending Kuki lands in Myanmar and India. Manipuri and Naga militants use our area as transit routes and often harass the villagers, demanding money, food and shelter. We are against this kind of activity, and do what we have to control it. We have around 2,000 armed cadres, and we procure our arms through dealers from Thailand, Myanmar and China,8221; says Thangboi.
One instance where the security forces have effectively plugged a route is via Shaibol village, 22 km from Sita and under heavy forest cover. In a recent operation, the 18 AR has now established a post in Shaibol, where no Army contingent had visited since WW II. 8220;Valley-based militants would move from Mintha in Myanmar in the night, trekking uphill for six hours to Shaibol before the high humidity forced them to take a break. After a halt in Shaibol, they would then move further up to Khoibu village before clearing the crestline and descending into the Imphal valley.
This route has now been plugged, but it8217;s not possible to patrol each and every part of this inhospitable terrain. Not surprisingly, the militants are now using an alternative route, travelling along the Taret River in Myanmar and entering Chandel. We are yet to access this area,8221; informs a source.
At the 57 Mountain Division HQ in Leimakhong outside Imphal, which together with the IGAR South HQ is in charge of the security forces deployment in Manipur, GOC Maj Gen EJ Kochchekan says joint counter-insurgency operations similar to the Bhutan ops may not be possible with the same intensity, as the relations between the Centre with monarchy in Bhutan and the military junta in Myanmar are quite different.
8220;Most of the militant camps in Manipur have been cleared, except for Samtal in Chandel. Both Old and New Samtal have militant presence,8221; Kochchekan said. The reason behind the security forces not being able to conduct operations here is being attributed by sources to the proximity with the Myanmar border. 8220;Samtal is just a couple of kilometres from the border. The moment we launch an operation, the militants will cross over into Myanmar, and we won8217;t be able to follow them. These are areas where the cooperation of the Myanmar Army is necessary.8221;
In fact, the militant camps are spread out along the border all the way from Border Post 53 to 98, which covers New Lajong, Molcham and Kovang, New and Old Samtal in Manipur and the corresponding areas of Hoinzin, Bokkan, Malu and Minthami in Myanmar. The camps are also said to be heavily clustered around the border trade town of Moreh, located in the Myanmarese areas of Old Moreh, Nanphalon and Tamu. These are the areas that the Centre would most probably be looking at, and where joint ops could be conducted.