An old friend comes calling

The second is about a recent incident where the young Nepalese Crown Prince Dhirendra, presiding over a meeting of an NGO at home, was confronted with an over-enthusiastic royalist who proclaimed that he would do anything for the kingship, including assassinate the Prime Minister of India.

Royalty, so far removed from the colourful chaos of the bazaar, is usually never a true indicator of the complex relationships that exist between democratic nations. But this is Nepal, where the King held full sway only until a decade ago and continues to wield a number of barely visible levers of power. But apart from Kathmandu8217;s own relationship with the Palace 8212; which has its own impact on New Delhi 8212; the two stories above show that the cultures of India and Nepal are as close as the two folded hands in a namaskar.

Under this clouded sun, Nepal8217;s Prime Minister G P Koirala is paying an official visit to India. The Nepalese press, reflecting perhaps the divisions within Koirala8217;s own Nepali Congress 8212; which drew much strength from Indian democray to mount its own people8217;s revolution in 1990 8212; as well as the politics of the Opposition, has gone to town about 8220;undue advantage8221; that has been taken of 8220;Nepalese decency and trust.8221;

The editorial in the Kathmandu Post offers advice on what New Delhi should do for a start: Withdraw its troops from Kalapani an ITBF outpost is stationed on a contested stretch of land in the far west of Nepal, overlooking China, demolish the Laxmanpur barrage on the border at UP, which Kathmandu claims has submerged large tracts of Nepalese territory; Delhi, however, denies the claim, and accept the Nepalese proposal to control and regulate the open border.

To the Post edit, Nepalese ambassador to India B.B. Thapa last week added a few more items that Kathmandu would like featured on the bilateral agenda: A review of the 1950 Treaty of Friendship between the two sides, equitable sharing of water resources Nepal8217;s rivers have a combined potential of 85,000 MW of hydro-power, even a partial exploitation of which would render redundant the much-touted Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, and a better interpretation and implementation of the Trade amp; Transit treaty.

The origin of the problem on the 1950 Treaty as well as on the border at Kalapani lies in the unspoken demarcation of the sphere of influence between India and China in the 1950s. The Himalayan watershed above Nepal was supposed to be the dividing line, with Beijing and New Delhi agreeing to restrict their clout to either side of the mountain range. That was really when India agreed to 8220;give up8221; Tibet to China, in exchange for the understanding that the nations south of the Himalayas 8212; Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim 8212; would be part of the Indian penumbra.

Key clauses in the 1950 Treaty, on security and defence, made it incumbent on Nepal to first clear this with India. So when Kathmandu intermittently raises these issues as a violation of its 8220;sovereignty8221;, New Delhi sees red. Once in a while it defends itself by quoting Bihar8217;s claims that Nepal is sitting on large tracts of ITS territory.

Certainly, the Indian government has no intention of keeping Nepal under its own security umbrella and officials point out that New Delhi has 8220;an open mind8221; on a treaty review. 8220;But Nepal must think of the implications that follow from an abrogation, amendment or a brand new treaty,8221; the officials add, pointing out that since there exists a very porous border, New Delhi has the 8220;right8221; to protect its own security interests.

8220;You cannot define the relationship with unilateral concessions from one side,8221; is the Capital8217;s view. 8220;It cannot be sustained in the long-term. Nepal needs to look at issues with greater maturity, while India needs more patience. But basically, India needs to avoid going on a guilt trip everytime some problem comes up.8221;

The hijacking of IC-814 in December from Kathmandu8217;s Tribhuvan airport focussed the relationship, warts and all, as it had never done before. New Delhi8217;s insistence that the long Terai border was being used by Pakistan8217;s ISI to set up terrorist bases aimed at India and that a majority of the staff at the Pakistan embassy in Kathmandu were actually ISI agents was thrust into Kathmandu8217;s face.

When the government justifiably sought an enhancement of security measures 8212; such as installing a secondary X-ray machine at the cargo area and ladder-point frisking 8212; Kathmandu hemmed and hawed. New Delhi didn8217;t budge. Kathmandu gave in after four full months, knowing well that air traffic was hurting its own tourism industry badly.

Today, the relationship has clearly reached a new low, and Koirala8217;s visit is aimed at rebuilding bridges. Old-timers compare this with the time when about a decade ago, Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister ordered the blockading of transit routes to Nepal and anti-India hysteria reached a stormy pitch. What escapes reason is why New Delhi, knowing its neighbour like the back of its own hand, is unable to anticipate the complexities so common with the 8220;small neighbour8221; syndrome. Worse, the government is not averse to playing intra-party politics within Nepal, often supporting one faction of the Nepali Congress against the other 8212; unfortunately, often, to its own detriment.

All these issues and more are likely to come up in talks with Koirala. Nepalese officials insist they want to be treated with far more seriousness from Delhi. New Delhi8217;s mantra on the other hand will call for 8220;mutual respect and concern to each other8217;s securities.8221; Maybe the twain, like the old friends that they are, will meet.

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