Air power is not an end in itself

Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Kosovo, the message is clear: Air power alone can't win wars. This is particularly relevant in our con...

Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and now Kosovo, the message is clear: Air power alone can8217;t win wars. This is particularly relevant in our context since after the Gulf War some defence experts suggested that what two squadrons of modern deep penetration aircraft could achieve even two Army divisions could not.

Undoubtedly, air power has come a long way since Giulio Douhet, an Italian military officer during World War I, who is generally regarded as the father of strategic air dominance. With effective air strikes and interdiction you can disorganise and even annihilate a country8217;s military assets and in turn coerce that nation into compliance. This was apparent during the Gulf War when the air strikes left Saddam Hussain debilitated and looking for a way out. Also air dominance can add to the pressure, as in the Dayton peace talks in 1995. That time the Bosnian Serb military had been unbalanced by Croat and Muslim ground offensives and the UN force in Bosnia had been reorganised into a serious fightingunit.

Yet it does not win a protracted conflict. Saddam Hussain is still in a menacing mode. In fact, air raids, which usually result in tremendous collateral damage, often end up bringing together diverse and opposing forces. Already in Kosovo at least two tragic bombing mistakes by NATO planes have been reported 8211; one on a passenger train killing 10 people, and second, an air strike on a convoy of Albanian refugees killing nearly 100. Such fatal mistakes also cause international uproar.

This is not to suggest the irrelevance of air power. Whether it is a snappy war or a prolonged one, air superiority is crucial to overall success. The most pronounced example is World War II in which Germany gained initial air superiority. This hel-ped it to have the upper edge in offensive after offensive; first in Poland in 1939, nine months la-ter against France and a year later against Russia. However, when Germany failed to win the Battle of Britain in the air, the tide began to turn. By the summer of 1944, theAllies had gained control over the skies in Germany, which decided the final outcome.

This has held true even later. In 1967 the Israelis first destroyed the Egyptian and Syrian air forces and then proceeded to lay waste the Egyptian army in the Sinai. In the 1973 war in the Middle East again, till Israel attained the superiority in the air, its army made no headway. In our own context, the success in East Pakistan in the 1971 operations was guaranteed the day the Air Force controlled the skies within hours of the conflict.

Though full details are still not known, the US strategy to use air power alone in Kosovo may have been guided by its successes earlier. During World War II it gained control of the islands in the Pacific to ensure a complete blockade against Japan. This along with the dropping of the two atom bombs brought Japan to its knees. Ho-wever, the conditions then were vastly different. Japan8217;s ultimate su-bjugation was only the cumulative effect of the way the war had progressed during theprevious months.

The lesson of Iraq and Kosovo is that for effective and durable success, air power sh-ould be properly integrated with the ground and naval forces. In Kosovo, air strikes were hasty because of which the desired objective 8211; of President Slobodan Milosevic halting violence in Kosovo 8211; could not be achieved. Now of course the NATO countries are considering following up the air strikes with a ground offensive, which will take time and by which time the situation could turn messier.

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While the Russian reference to the air force during World War II as mobile artillery today appears to be an understatement, it is apparent that over the years while methods of war change, the principles of war don8217;t. Unless the objective is specific like rescue operations, the basic battlefield concept of close air support to ground operations in a full fledged war still holds good. This is particularly true if territory is vital as it invariably is in our environment vis-a-vis Pakistan and China. Ground forceswill continue to hold the pivotal role when you are committed to holding every inch of your land.

However, one positive lesson from Kosovo for us is the need to acquire more deep penetration long range aircraft. This was first evident during World War II and then during the Gulf War. In the South Asian context, this becomes important when India thinks in terms of China being one of its major adversaries. Long range missiles have changed today8217;s battlefield scenario, but experience to date has shown that ground-based defences alone, whether anti-aircraft artillery or guided missile systems, have not been able to provide effective opposition to an air offensive. The 1973 war in the Middle East is a case in point. In the Gulf War too, Iraq8217;s missile defence and offence, which it activated against its adversaries, was neutralised within hours.

Of course in the final analysis, battle options depend on the political and military objective is it to seek favourable terms in an armistice, to call off a bluff, toforce an unconditional surrender or to pursue total annihilation? A clarity of objective also helps in focussing on the opponent8217;s centre of gravity, as we did triumphantly in 1971. This may have been Pakistan8217;s failure in 1965, the US8217; in the Gulf War and now NATO8217;s in Kosovo. The intent helps decide on the use of the air force, the ground troops or the naval armada in isolation or in tandem. When the objective is all-encompassing, air power is not an end in itself but a crucial means to that end.