A tale of 500 million Muslims

If India had not been partitioned, there would have been 450 million Muslims in India today.

But India’s independence on August 15, 1947, was also accompanied by a division of the country and a parcelling of Muslim populations first into two, then three countries — India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. The country was divided on the basis of what came to be known as the two-nation theory, that is Hindus and Muslims constitute two separate nations.

If that theory were universally accepted, then all Indian Muslims, including those from President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam’s village in Rameswaram, would have had to be transferred to a Pakistan whose contours would then be different from what obtains today.

The Congress, then leading the national movement, did not accept the two-nation theory and at least two senior leaders protested against the partition plan — Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Thus were born a secular democratic India and a theocratic Pakistan.

Islam proved to be a weak glue to keep the nation together. So ferocious was the Punjabi Muslim attack on the Bengali-speaking people of the then East Pakistan in 1971 that, with Indian help, it broke away as Bangladesh.

Relations between India and Bangladesh are defined by a different socio-cultural complexity, the two partitions of Bengal, juxtaposed against the exquisite fact that the national anthems of India and Bangladesh are composed by the same poet. On the one hand is an Islamic movement, on the other a 100 schools teaching Rabindra Sangeet across the country. Take your pick: encourage one of the two tendencies.

However, it is the ideological confrontation between a secular, democratic India and an Islamic Pakistan which has plagued the subcontinent the most. Since 1971 the arithmetic has been particularly awkward for Pakistan. India has the world’s second largest Muslim population, greater than the population of Pakistan. How must Pakistan define its nationalism?

In pure Islamic terms, of course. Further, the authors of the Pakistani state, as separate from the people, feel threatened if Indian Muslims are seen to be thriving in a secular framework. It is ironical but true that the theocratic, Islamic state, which came into being ostensibly to protect Muslim interests on the sub-continent, takes heart from events like Gujarat or the fact that Muslims are getting more and more distant from government jobs in India. In other words, the rise of communalism in India is a source of security to the theocratic state. To this extent, the Hindutva forces in Gujarat are actually playing a Pakistani hand.

In brief, a secular India causes Pakistan to fall back on double and triple distilled, Arabised Islam, disengaged from the Sufi, Bhakti traditions of India. This kind of Pakistan, in perpetual hostility to India, becomes an automatic reservoir for the kind of extremism which was on evidence in large pockets of Pakistan prior to September 11.

Over a period of time, this perpetual hostility causes the Indian secular fabric to fray. The rise of Hindu extremism causes a gradual alienation of the Muslim minority who then become hospitable to hostile influences from across the border — and not only in Kashmir. A few more Gujarats and you have the ground fertile for Al Qaeda cells in parts of India we have not even begun to imagine.

It follows that Indo-Pak harmony is almost a pre-requisite for the promotion of moderation on both sides of the border. Once this seemingly impossible task is achieved, 500 million Muslims will become a powerful engine for moderation worldwide. But how is the impossible to be achieved?

On September 17 2000, a historic meeting was held in the Acton Town Hall in London. MQM leader Altaf Hussain, Baluchistan’s Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Pashtun leader Achakzai and representatives of the most powerful Sindhi nationalists declared partition as ‘‘the greatest blunder in the history of mankind’’. The thrust of the conference was to break away from the stranglehold of the Punjabi-dominated army which was fuelling Islamic fundamentalism. Political leaders in Islamabad looked on helplessly.

The American-led war against terrorism provided General Pervez Musharraf with an occasion to cut his losses and distance himself from Talibanisation and extremism of all hues. Initially, Musharraf had strong middle class support. But since the referendum, his opponents seem to be closing in on him. New Delhi, too, is watching the situation. Should American adoration for Musharraf be taken at face value or could a safe transition be expected in Islamabad? That the US, UK, French, European Union foreign ministers are all visiting New Delhi and Islamabad, creates the impression that the global spotlight is on the Line of Control, the coming elections in Kashmir and a possible Indo-Pak dialogue.

But the American attention span on the region cannot be taken for granted. Middle East, the US economy, preparations for an attack on Iraq are of much greater saliency to the White House than the sub-continent unless some nuclear danger lurks in the background.

In India, too, there is a question or two. Supposing, under western pressure, Islamabad does hold back on militancy in Kashmir during the elections, will a free, fair, violence-free election be possible? Will at least non-official foreign observers be allowed?

What about militants already in India? Successful elections in Kashmir will lead to a softening of the mood in India. How will that mood square with the ruling party’s campaign in Gujarat? Through it all, not to be lost sight of should be the critical perspective: 500 million Muslims to be moderated or radicalised?

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