A new strategic dialogue

Its first and obvious purpose was preparation for President Clinton8217;s proposed South Asian tour this autumn. Richardson brought letters from Clinton to the heads of government of all the countries he visited, indicating a rough time-frame for his tour and the political concerns he would like to discuss.

The second point, which we in India should take note of and which we are somewhatreluctant to acknowledge, is that the visit was not quot;Indo-centricquot;. Its signal was US foreign policy being focused on the broader South Asian region rather than India, though India remains a major point of interest.

The third objective was to give advance notice to the concerned South Asian governments of the agenda of discussions Clinton would wish for and an articulation of US political and strategic priorities on this region, to which they would like a positive individual and collective South Asian response.

The fourth objective was to assess the most recent trends affecting the strategic and security environment in South-East Asia, especially in terms of the strategic postures and weapons systems doctrines of India and Pakistan. The fifth was to expedite, to the extent feasible, normalisation in Afghanistan in the context of America8217;s economic interests in the Central Asian region.

The sixth objective was to assess the evolving internal political and economic situation in the region and governments8217;policies affecting this phenomenon with a view to charting US economic investment and technological policies related to South Asia.

The seventh objective was to influence India and Pakistan8217;s nuclear and space programmes so that they do not contradict the broad US horizontal non-proliferation agenda. The overarching aim was to explore and assess the limitations on the prospects for America8217;s politico-economic cooperation with the countries of the region, especially with Pakistan and India as major entities in the area. We must view Ambassador Richardson8217;s discussions in India in this context.

Richardson8217;s significant exchanges were with Prime Minister Vajpayee and Home Minister Advani, during which he stressed the high importance that the USA attaches to relations with India and dilated on the positive prospects of Indo-US economic, technological and general political cooperation. He stressed that Clinton8217;s visit would be a catalytic opportunity to expand the range and content of relations, and of coursehe underlined the importance of India joining the mainstream of non-proliferation activities. This advocacy naturally took into account Pakistan8217;s acquisition of Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile capacities and Indian pronouncements on nuclear weaponisation and increasing missile capacities. While the politically correct public stance was that it is India8217;s sovereign discretion to determine how to ensure its security, the substantive message was that India should show restraint and eschew any qualitative change in its nuclear weaponisation and missile development policies.

Richardson8217;s argument must have been that restraint was much more desirable in the context of Pakistan8217;s strident inclinations reflected in the test-firing of the Ghauri missile. This was not a new response to the subcontinent8217;s changing security environment. James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to Clinton on National Security Affairs, had stated in a policy pronouncement last year: quot;In South Asia, India and Pakistan have acquired nuclearand missile capabilities and are due to expand their programme although each side has avoided acknowledging its capabilities and deploying such weapons. A near-term political solution to proliferation in South Asia is unlikely8230;The United States will continue to encourage India and Pakistan to settle their difference at the negotiating table. We also continue to urge both sides to move in the right direction on the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and to freeze and eventually eliminate their nuclear and missile arsenals.quot;

The new development is that Pakistan had assertively emphasised its missile and nuclear weapons capabilities when the Richardson visit was taking place and the new Indian government had articulated clear intentions of responding to the enhanced threat perceptions resulting from the missile and nuclear weapons deployment pattern around India.

The Richardson team also urged accelerated economic liberalisation, suggesting India8217;s adherence to evolvinginternational trade regimes which would ensure the quid pro quo of investment and technology transfers.

It would be pertinent to examine the ingredients which would constitute the strategic dialogue between India and the US in the coming months in the context of America8217;s perceptions about South Asia and its foreign-policy priorities. The Indo-US strategic dialogue, as far as can be anticipated, will not involve discussions on forging a broad politico-strategic equation affecting coordination of foreign and defence policies and evolving mechanisms to develop joint strategies for security and stability in South Asia. Nor would it, in the foreseeable future, involve a move to create bilateral institutional arrangements of the type which exist between the US and Japan, the US and Australia and even the US and Pakistan. The strategic dialogue will involve non-proliferation, disarmament and arms-control issues, matters related to economic reforms and transfer of technology subject to US laws and policies. Amajor item on this agenda would be Indo-Pak relations. It would be an exaggeration to give Indo-US discussions the adjective of a quot;strategic dialoguequot; aimed at establishing a macro-level partnership given the differences between the two on Indian security concerns, America8217;s regional strategic objectives and the limitations imposed on India by its domestic, economic and political predicaments. Nevertheless, Richardson has had the chance to make a personal assessment of the chemistry of India8217;s new power structure and its broad orientations. The general impression one gathers is of Richardson having been given general assurances about India not taking precipitate or immediate action to induct nuclear weapons or to enhance its missile capacities. While this would aid a practical and problem-solving approach in Indo-US relations, it is a moot point whether it would meet over time the basic needs of India8217;s security. Clinton will come to India without any illusions, which is good for Indo-US relations.