What to make of Trump’s plans to ‘own’ Gaza – and why have Jordan and Egypt refused to take in displaced Palestinians?

Second, he said that the US will “take over Gaza and…do a job with it too”. America will “own” Gaza, and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East”, he said – an idea similar to the one floated by his son-in-law Jared Kushner last year about making Gaza a valuable “waterfront property”.

Third, he announced the return of “maximum pressure” on Iran, after signing an executive order to that end, and re-designated the Yemeni Houthis a terrorist organisation.

What are the analytical takeaways from Trump’s proposals?

The President’s new proposal for Gaza (and Palestine) risks violating long-standing UNSC and UNGA resolutions supporting the Palestinian right of self-determination (which India has proactively backed at the United Nations), and several peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) including those that prohibit ethnic cleansing.

Trump’s claim that Gazans do not want to return contrasts with abundant evidence from the enclave following the ceasefire, with thousands returning to North Gaza – even though Israeli bombardment has turned many homes to rubble.

The proposal to identify “1, 2, 3, 4, or 8 or 12” alternative sites for Palestinians to live in peace while Gaza is turned into the “Riviera” effectively means the displacement and scattering of the existing Palestinian population – the fate that the Jews of Europe and elsewhere suffered until the World Zionist Congress and leaders such as Theodor Herzl sought to establish a Jewish state in Palestine in 1897.

The radical shift in Trump’s vision for Palestine also contrasts his own “Peace to Prosperity” plan of 2020 which presented a comprehensive pathway to a Palestinian state, albeit with severely limited sovereignty and unprecedented concessions to Israel by legitimising its illegal settlements in occupied territory and the annexation of more Palestinian land.

Trump’s new approach is more coloured with transactionalism than his first. When asked to clarify what the US “taking over” Gaza means, Trump said he sees “a long term ownership position”. This language is distinct from traditional framings of sovereignty or occupation, and closer to real-estate deals.

Trump also expressly refused to clarify if the US has stopped supporting the two-state solution, saying that it would be clear in the coming weeks.

For the Israeli government, the new Trump plan is ideal – and Netanyahu reiterated that Trump is the best friend in the White House that Israel has ever had. Netanyahu’s ruling coalition is dependent on support from Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism party, which is vociferous on the need for settlement expansion.

The Prime Minister’s own claim that Israel still seeks the complete elimination of Hamas from Gaza complicates the post-ceasefire scenario in Palestine, especially as the outgoing Biden administration assessed that Hamas had replaced all fighters lost to Israeli action in 15 months.

With negotiations over stage two of the current ceasefire officially underway since February 4, Trump’s and Netanyahu’s statements inject more uncertainty over the ceasefire’s sustenance following the release of all hostages by Hamas.

Why are Egypt and Jordan resistant to accepting displaced Palestinians?

Both countries have been fierce in their opposition to any plan to resettle Palestinians on their land, the last two times Trump fleetingly voiced the idea.

In response to Trump’s latest proposal, Jordanian officials have reiterated their Foreign Ministry’s September 2024 statement that any Israeli attempt to displace Palestinians to Jordan would be considered “a declaration of war” and a breach of their 1994 peace treaty. Both Israel and Jordan have already amassed more troops at their border (with the IDF even creating a new eastern division) against the backdrop of plummeting political ties.

Jordan’s unwavering resistance to the American proposal is driven less by ideological or moral stakes in the Palestinian question, and more by existential factors – both demographic and political.

The state is the third poorest globally in terms of water resources, and already hosts more than 2 million Palestinian refugees – 1 in every 5 individuals in Jordan’s population.

More importantly, the burgeoning Palestinian population has long been a political powder keg, that has often grown restive over perceptions of Jordan’s deep security ties with Israel and the US. The Hashemite monarchy has kept a close watch on the risk from Palestinian armed resistance, especially since the events of Black September in 1970, when an armed rebellion by the Palestine Liberation Organisation came close to threatening the Jordanian monarchy, until it was put down through brute force.

In the decades since, Amman has applied a mix of political, social, and cultural instruments to combat and contain both Islamist and Palestinian nationalist currents within Jordan. For perspective, the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan won only five seats in the 2020 Parliamentary elections, but in the elections of September 2024, with a campaign pitch that included strong support for Hamas in Gaza, the IAF won 31 seats – a number not seen in 30 years since the party’s founding in 1992.

For Egypt, the political concern is largely similar, apart from the fact that accepting Trump’s ideas and actively participating in scuttling the Palestinian question will have unpredictable political consequences, both domestically and internationally.

For President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, whose politics was founded on fighting against the Muslim Brotherhood since the 2013 coup, these consequences might include fresh political fuel for a movement that he has fought hard to remove from Egypt, even resorting to harsh authoritarian measures.

What does the return of maximum pressure on Iran mean for the Arab world?

President Trump’s actions and statements thus far have flowed against the political tide of the Middle East.

On Palestine, while Trump said “everybody I have spoken to loves the idea of the US owning that piece of land [Gaza]”, Arab leaders have long rejected the idea of Palestinian resettlement. The Foreign Ministers of Jordan, UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar reiterated this in a joint statement just four days earlier.

Similarly, while Trump claimed that Saudi Arabia was not insistent on a Palestinian state to normalize ties with Israel, the Saudi state issued a swift rejection of the claim.

On Iran, even as Trump revived his “maximum pressure” policy, he reiterated his openness to a deal: “I hated doing it, I would love to be able to make a great deal. I hope we’re able to do something so it doesn’t end up in a very catastrophic situation,” he said.

Regardless of Trump’s posturing on Iran, the Gulf Arab-Iran relationship is on a positive trajectory. The Iran-UAE Joint Economic Committee unveiled its first plans for multi-sectoral cooperation in May 2024, and Saudi-Iran bilateral trade has resumed since April 2023.

But it is their defence contact that is more unprecedented. The Saudi military’s Chief of General Staff Fayyad al-Ruwaili visited Tehran last November, and Iranian naval vessels are at present at the UAE’s Khalid port for the first time in the history of the Emirates and the Islamic Republic.

These include the newest warships of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (distinct from the Iranian Navy), with IRGC officers being welcomed by Emirati government and military officials in Sharjah, presenting never-seen-before pictures. The IRGC’s attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz had strained the UAE-Iran relationship across the last decade, with the first Trump administration designating the IRGC “as a whole” as a foreign terrorist organisation in 2019.

This is as much of a watershed for Iran as it is for the UAE, since Tehran has long shamed and distanced Abu Dhabi for its normalisation with Israel.

Collectively, these developments raise questions over the implications of fresh US sanctions on Iranian entities, on the new economic and military bridges that Gulf Arab states have been building with Iran. Moreover, across the last week, Iran has expressed willingness for talks on its nuclear program if the “West” is serious, and Iranian state media has lauded Trump’s decision to end foreign aid which Tehran believes to have helped Iranian dissidents and foreign-based-opposition.

As Arab-Iran tensions recede, the ball remains in Washington’s court.

Bashir Ali Abbas is a Senior Research Associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi