Apart from attending the inaugural Raisina Middle East Dialogue as Chief Guest, EAM Jaishankar held talks with several Emirati leaders, including President Mohammad bin Zayed, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Khaled bin Mohammad (who visited India in September) and Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (who visited India in December).
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has visited the Emirates seven times during his premiership. In the region, as the Gaza ceasefire tenuously holds, how is the UAE positioned in the crisis? What are its regional priorities? And how do they tie in with India’s?
How is the UAE positioned in the current regional crisis?
The UAE seems to have agreed ‘in principle’ to help Gaza’s post-war administration, at least as per Israeli reports. Since the beginning of the Gaza war, Abu Dhabi has prioritised the continuation of diplomatic ties with Israel and leveraging that to influence Israeli actions in Palestine, rather than break away from the Abraham Accords or pursue punitive measures against Tel Aviv.
But Abu Dhabi’s criticism of Israel in multilateral fora has been scathing, supporting Arab/Gulf characterisations of Israeli actions in Gaza as ‘genocide’, condemning its ‘collective punishment’, and consistently re-affirming that an independent Palestinian state is the only path to stability.
With the present global focus on Gaza’s ‘day-after’ reconstruction serving as the immediate context, Abu Dhabi’s position is built on two pillars.
First, both Gaza and the West Bank should be united “under a single, legitimate Palestinian Authority” that is “led by an empowered, credible and independent new Prime Minister”, as Lana Nusseibeh (UAE’s Assistant Minister for Political Affairs) wrote in Financial Times last July. This is an effective rejection of the PA in its current form and its incumbent premier, Mohammed Shtayyeh (who President Mahmoud Abbas appointed in March 2024) and whose popularity amidst Palestinians is suspect.
While Abu Dhabi’s focus on the need for a reformed PA has been consistent, the Palestinian Authority had rejected Emirati presence in Gaza’s post-conflict governance, conveying it to news outlet Al Araby Al-Jadeed last October.
Two, the UAE’s potential involvement in post-war Gaza has been made contingent on the withdrawal of Israeli security presence in Gaza and Israel’s cooperation in establishing a Palestinian state. Emirati officials have strongly reiterated this point for 15 months, with MBZ asserting in May last year that Abu Dhabi would not “cover” for Israel’s presence in Gaza after Netanyahu called for Emirati cooperation.
Israel itself seeks a greater role for the UAE in Gaza (its closest Gulf partner), and Aryeh Deri of Israel’s Charedi Shas party (part of Netanyahu’s governing coalition) called upon the Emirates’ Foreign Minister recently to discuss this.
What are the UAE’s regional priorities?
Along with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates is the other engine driving the Gulf’s economic diversification, which necessitates a push away from forever wars in the Middle East and towards stability. And Abu Dhabi has a lot at stake.
The UAE holds the world’s second largest sovereign wealth fund, cumulatively amounting to over two trillion US dollars, second only to China, and the world’s eighth largest proven oil reserves. This has also allowed the Emirates to take greater risks and push for a larger leadership role in the region, for which it competes with Saudi Arabia — the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, G20 member, and most populous of Gulf Arab states.
For instance, the UAE went against concerns that other Gulf monarchies had about civil nuclear power plants (after the Fukushima disaster in Japan), and began building the Barakah nuclear plant with South Korean help in 2012. Completed in 2024, the plant increases the need for Abu Dhabi to safeguard its energy mix from conflict, especially after the Yemeni Houthis proved their capability to attack Emirati critical infrastructure in 2022.
In Palestine, the UAE is motivated less by ideological affinity and more by a recognition of the need for long-term stability, which can only be achieved by full statehood and economic development.
However, a strong Emirati role in Palestine’s post-war reconstruction also risks direct blow-back for the Gulf Arab monarchy, if Israel sabotages progress on Palestinian statehood. This explains the strong qualifier of Israeli guarantees for a Palestinian state that Abu Dhabi asks for before integrating itself into Gaza’s day after.
With Israeli willingness for a Palestinian state at a historic low — with more settlement expansion expected and Hamas weakened but still potent — the risks are greater. The elements of uncertainty are simply too many for Abu Dhabi, supplemented by the unpredictability of US President Donald Trump’s second term.
How have India-UAE ties evolved in recent years?
The UAE’s approach to resolving the Israel-Palestine issue is closest to what India itself envisages as a ‘negotiated solution’ that includes all parties. But India-UAE alignment goes beyond Palestine.
Abu Dhabi and New Delhi have also found a way to reinforce each other’s new geopolitical objectives. On one hand, India has proactively participated and led new regional arrangements such as the I2U2 and the IMEEC. On the other hand, UAE has both refrained from backing the Pakistani position on the Kashmir dispute and has emerged as a key partner in developmental projects in J&K since August 2019, with entities such as the Lulu Group investing in commercial infrastructure in the valley.
Amidst the new crisis in the region, the India-UAE relationship has existed in an almost distinct silo.
In any case, there is enough to guard-rail the bilateral relationship from regional crises. UAE hosts the largest population of the Indian diaspora, which contributes to approximately 18% of all remittances. Apart from a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, both states have carved out special cooperative arrangements across sectors, such as a Bilateral Investment Treaty and civil nuclear cooperation since September.
While both states are each other’s second largest trading partners, India-UAE trade ties have also largely weathered the current crisis in the Red Sea — bilateral trade fell from $84.84 billion in 2022-2023 to $83.65 billion in 2023-2024, a marginal dip compared to India-Israel or India-Saudi Arabia trade for instance.
However, the biggest geopolitical step for India, UAE and other partner states that was contingent on a post-Abraham Accords stable Middle East was the mega India Middle East Europe economic corridor (IMEEC). Hence, it is in both New Delhi’s and Abu Dhabi’s core interest to ensure that order is not disrupted by the eruption of regional fault-lines again.
Jaishankar with Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Maktoum, the Minister of Defence of the UAE. (Photo: X/@DrSJaishankar) 
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