The IED blast in Maharashtra's Gadchiroli district, which has left 15 Maharashtra Police C-60 personnel and the driver of their private vehicle dead, adds another chapter to the district's long history of Maoist violence. Of late, the narrative that has been pushed in Maharashtra is that the state has asserted control over the district, manifested in the huge success in the April 2018 encounter that left 38 alleged Maoists dead. Wednesday's attack could be read as having broken that narrative. Gadchiroli, with its dense forests and rivers and sparse population, has long been a difficult terrain for security personnel to control and operate in. What adds to the forces'difficulty is the ability of the Maoists to cross borders at will, given Gadchiroli's location at the trijunction of Maharashtra (of which it is part), Chhattisgarh, and Telanagana. Read | Gadchiroli Maoist attack kills 16: Here is a list of major Naxal violence this year With the coordination among state forces not always at optimal levels, Gadchiroli offers both a corridor for passage, as well as a mostly safe holding area for Maoists. It was this confidence that they are safe that proved to be the undoing of the Maoists last year, who were holding a meeting of senior cadre when the encounter took place. Maharashtra's efforts to reach out to local adivasis and build local intelligence, has contributed to reducing Gadchiroli to a holding area for Maoists, rather than one where they are able to carry out aggressive attacks. "After the setback of April 2018, the Maoists would have felt the need to register their presence. The delay of a year in carrying out the attack suggests it took them some effort to get the logistics in place. An IED attack is a low-cost strike; all it requires is one person sitting next to the road with either a command wire or a remote control," an officer said. While investigations are underway, some important questions must be asked of the state police. First, the attack took place after a group of Maoists committed arson on construction vehicles close to the encounter spot. Given that the presence of Maoists in the area had already been confirmed, and with the police apparently having the advantage of active intelligence networks, it is odd that they were unable to identify a threat, or that an IED had been planted. Second, the 15 personnel who were killed were travelling together in a private vehicle, a way of travel that is strongly discouraged under Standard Operating Procedures. "IED blasts cause damage when they hit forces travelling together. For instance, in Maoist areas, forces are encouraged to travel on foot - and when they are travelling by road, a separate road opening party sanitises the area first. If a place has to be reached quickly, motorcycles being ridden by two people, with a gap between two bikes, is the standard procedure adopted to minimise the effect of an IED attack. In a private vehicle by contrast, the men are sitting ducks for IEDs," a senior officer said.
