“Throughout these past six years that I have been in politics, one thing has been clear to me. And that is, as I have often stated, that the post of Prime Minister is not my aim. I was always certain that if ever I found myself in the position that I am in today, I would follow my own inner voice. Today, that voice tells me I must humbly decline this post,” Sonia Gandhi stunned the Congress and the political world with these words in May 2004, opening a new chapter in Indian politics which saw the elevation of Manmohan Singh as PM. While what prompted Gandhi to decline the top post is still a mystery to many, Natwar Singh, once a 10, Janpath insider, claimed in his autobiography that she refused to become the PM because of pressure from her son, Rahul, who feared for her life. Party insiders also say that once she had made up her mind to decline the post, Gandhi always had the soft-spoken and scholarly Singh in mind for it. Former President Pranab Mukherjee too was then speculated to be in the race, but he knew his turn would not come, that Sonia would prefer Singh. In her book Pranab My Father – A Daughter Remembers, Mukherjee’s daughter Sharmishta recalled a conversation she had with her father. “Following Sonia’s decision to withdraw from the prime ministerial race, there was intense speculation within the media and political spheres. The names of Dr Manmohan Singh and Pranab were being discussed as the top contenders for the position. I did not have the chance to meet Baba for a couple of days as he was terribly busy, but I spoke to him over the phone. I asked him excitedly if he was going to become the PM. His response was blunt, ‘No, she will not make me the PM’. It’ll be Manmohan Singh,” she wrote. However, Singh’s 10 years as PM saw his government and the party headed by Gandhi pulling in different directions at times. Adding to the perception of drift and rift was the extra constitutional National Advisory Council (NAC) headed by Gandhi and comprising civil society activists and academics. She and the NAC, which was accused of acting like a super Cabinet, were often seen as undermining Singh’s authority and that of the Prime Minister’s Office, a charge both Singh and Gandhi publicly denied. Despite this, the economist PM displayed amazing dexterity in marrying the NAC’s socialist and welfarist discourse with his free market outlook. Years later, Singh’s former media advisor Sanjaya Baru adjudged the power-sharing model between Singh as PM and Gandhi as party chief in his book The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh as: “While power was delegated, authority was not.” Baru quoted Singh as telling him: “You see, you must understand one thing. I have come to terms with this. There cannot be two centres of power. That creates confusion. I have to accept that the party president is the centre of power. The government is answerable to the party.” Singh’s Cabinet was also marked by stories of rifts. Some of the leaders, both in the party and the Ministry, despised the NAC members and sympathized with the PM. They talked about key files being taken to 10, Janpath, for approval; about the NAC writing to ministers and seeking compliance reports on its recommendations and proposals. The perception was that Singh was not entirely happy, as he had no role in the NAC set-up. Others, ready to bend over backwards to please Gandhi, rushed to defend her saying she was only briefed on policy matters as the party president. The perception of this “weak” PM gained further strength when Natwar Singh, who was a minister in the UPA I government but had to resign after the Volcker report on alleged fraud in the Oil-for-Food programme for war-torn Iraq, claimed in his book that official files were routinely carried by PMO official Pulok Chatterjee to Gandhi. Neither was the party entirely pleased with the PM for putting the government on the line on the Indo-US nuclear deal. A Left leader who was a key part of the intense faceoff and hard-nosed negotiations between the government on the issue revealed in private that they were given to understand by Gandhi that the situation would not come to a breakdown. However, she was also clear that it was Singh who would take the final call – and he did. That is perhaps why after the 2009 unexpected poll win following the nuclear deal high, Gandhi continued with Singh as PM and chose Mukherjee for the post of President. In one of his memoirs, Mukherjee wrote about Gandhi telling him on June 2, 2012, that he was most eminently suited for the high office of the President, but that he had a crucial role to play in the functioning of the UPA government. In fact, he wrote, Gandhi also asked him to suggest an alternative name as the UPA’s presidential nominee. “I returned with a vague impression that she might wish to consider Manmohan Singh as the UPA presidential nominee. I thought that if she selected Singh for the presidential office, she may choose me as the prime minister. I had heard a rumour that she had given this formulation serious thought,” Mukherjee wrote. Their difficult power-sharing notwithstanding, Gandhi and Singh shared immense mutual respect. That warmth and camaraderie remained intact even after the Congress’s humiliating defeat in 2014, which was largely because of the massive anger against the UPA II government led by Singh. One reason surely was that Gandhi was mindful of the bad press she had received over the way P V Narasimha Rao was sidelined by the Congress after his term as PM ended, and how he was humiliated even in death. Gandhi ensured that the blame for the 2014 poll rout did not fall squarely on Singh. He remained a member of the Rajya Sabha till April this year. In 2018, at an India Today Conclave in Mumbai, Gandhi was asked why she gave up the chance to become PM in 2004 and named Singh. “I knew my limitations,” she said. “I knew Manmohan Singh would be a better PM than me.”
