Opinion After Pahalgam: Why Pakistan’s foreign affairs matters for India’s security
Whatever calculations the US had made regarding Imran Khan and the fall of his government, New Delhi will likely have learnt by now that it should have urged consultation
The Pahalgam terror attack and subsequent escalation are partly the result of a Pakistani leadership struggling for legitimacy in the eyes of its own people following the ouster of Imran Khan’s government with a “foreign hand” factor -
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Written by Kadira Pethiyagoda
The Pahalgam attack and the consequent escalation likely have their roots in the regime-change that took place in Pakistan three years ago. Following the toppling of Prime Minister Imran Khan, the new leadership faced constant unrest and protests by the public. The one “tried and true” method for gaining legitimacy was a clash with India. Khan himself, and others, alleged that the Biden Administration played a role in his ouster, an incentive being the PM’s neutrality over the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Pakistan’s military has had links to the US for a long time. All this signals a blind-spot in recent Indian foreign policy: The role of extra-regional powers that are not China, within South Asia. Future Indian governments are likely to face pressure to address this, not simply for immediate stability, but because denying external actors the ability to shape politics in one’s region is a prerequisite to becoming a great power.
The ousting of the most popular prime minister that Pakistan has ever had resulted in a public outcry. Millions marched demanding free elections, with Khan as one of the candidates. The state resorted to increasingly repressive crackdowns, as public anger reached an unprecedented tipping point. The one thing that could restore legitimacy and rally the people behind the Shehbaz Sharif government was a war with India. Then came April 22. The terrorists who killed 26 people in Pahalgam provided the Pakistani government a lifeline of legitimacy. It was only when the conflict risked spiraling out of control — which could actually harm Sharif’s rule — that Islamabad welcomed an off-ramp.
What does this mean for India? For many decades, New Delhi applied the Indira doctrine to deny extra-regional powers a foothold in South Asia. Following the end of the Cold War, this approach was tempered with regard to the US. For the last decade, the doctrine was applied with increased vigour against China. This is understandable, given that Beijing has, at least since the end of the Cold War, posed a greater direct threat than Washington.
Pahalgam is a reminder, however, of the importance of paying strategic attention to the role of any great powers in India’s neighbourhood. According to Khan, the US role in his ouster ranged from supporting the generals in their efforts to instigating the MPs to vote against him in the first place. Applying the cui bono or “who benefits” principle, it is clear that the Biden administration’s interests were served. Three years ago, Imran Khan visited Moscow, defied Western demands and proclaimed that he would continue trading with Russia in the interests of the Pakistani people. Today, he sits in jail while the leadership in Islamabad turns to the US to drive a ceasefire with India — a dramatic turnaround. It was even recently reported that Pakistan has a shortage of artillery ammunition that has reduced its warfighting capabilities to as little as four days, due to having sold arms to Ukraine.
Whatever calculations Washington made regarding Imran Khan, New Delhi will likely have learnt by now that it should have urged consultation. And if consultation was offered, the Modi government will realise now that it should have impressed upon Biden that India’s interests in regional stability had to be considered, particularly given the Pakistani military’s relations with non-state actors. External interference almost always results in instability.
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Such an intervention by New Delhi would have aligned squarely with India’s great power ambitions. Washington has its own version of the Indira doctrine— the Monroe Doctrine, which challenged European intervention in the Americas from the 1800s, providing a stable and secure near-abroad for the US to grow into a great power. States considered “friendly” did not get a free pass. As George Washington himself warned earlier, “The nation which indulges toward another a habitual hatred or a habitual fondness is in some degree a slave.” Jawaharlal Nehru echoed this sentiment in the 1940s. Trump does the same today. And, long before all of them, Kautilya said it.
The Pahalgam terror attack and subsequent escalation are partly the result of a Pakistani leadership struggling for legitimacy in the eyes of its own people following the overthrowing of Imran Khan’s government with a “foreign hand” factor. In decades past, New Delhi adopted the Indira doctrine to deny extra-regional powers a foothold in South Asia. Today it applies almost exclusively to China. Going forward, however, the 2025 Indo-Pakistan standoff will likely mean pressure on future governments to prevent foreign intrigue in neighbouring countries — regardless of who it involves. This is not least because, in an emerging multipolar world, exclusive regional primacy is necessary for India’s enduring foreign policy goal to become a great power.
The writer was a Fellow at the Brookings Institution and is author of the book Indian Foreign Policy and Cultural Values
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