Opinion Shashi Tharoor writes: The world after the American order

Still, it took the presidency of Donald Trump to truly accelerate the unravelling. His embrace of ultranationalism, disdain for multilateral institutions, and aggressive trade policies marked a sharp departure from the bipartisan tradition of American globalism. Trump’s administration viewed the post-war system not as a legacy to uphold, but as a liability — one that had enabled rivals like China to rise at America’s expense. While it is dangerous to draw sweeping conclusions from his erratic social media posts, or even his extraordinary rant at the opening day of the UN General Assembly session, his tweet writing off India and Russia as “lost” to “deepest, darkest China” seemed to set the seal on US disengagement — even if he has seemingly pulled back from that later, with his dramatic announcement of a peace deal over Gaza.

This rupture has had profound consequences. By undermining the very institutions that once projected US influence, Trump opened the door for alternative visions of global governance. Beijing, long wary of American dominance, seized the opportunity to recast itself as a defender of multilateralism and stability. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasised the need to “safeguard the authority of the United Nations” and promote “inclusive economic globalisation” — a rhetorical pivot that positions China as a responsible stakeholder in contrast to Washington’s perceived belligerence.

Xi’s message resonates more strongly today than it might have a decade ago. As Trump’s second term unfolds, his administration’s confrontational stance toward key Global South powers — especially India and Brazil — has alienated partners and pushed them toward Beijing. Xi used the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in China to call for resistance to “hegemonism and power politics”, a thinly veiled critique of US foreign policy, and to champion “true multilateralism”.

This reorientation is not merely symbolic. China has become the largest trading partner for over 100 countries, including many of those represented at the summit. In an era of economic uncertainty, Beijing’s promise of predictability and infrastructure investment — through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative — offers an appealing alternative to the volatility of Trump’s tariff-threatening America. While China’s own economic practices remain opaque and state-driven, they now appear less destabilising than Washington’s erratic trade wars and punitive sanctions, accompanied by the surround-sound of gratuitous insults.

The implications of this shift are far-reaching. Trump’s approach has not only weakened America’s soft power but also eroded its credibility as a global leader. By sidelining institutions like USAID, silencing public diplomacy outlets, withholding payments of dues to international organisations and withdrawing from key UN agencies, the administration has dismantled the very tools that once enabled the US to shape international norms. This self-inflicted retreat has emboldened rivals and unsettled allies, leaving a vacuum that China is eager to fill.

Critics within the US foreign policy establishment warn of dire consequences. Former defence officials argue that dismantling the post-war order threatens global stability and undermines decades of diplomatic progress. While some analysts stop short of apocalyptic predictions, there is broad consensus that Trump’s policies are accelerating a transition toward a more fragmented and competitive world.

This new era is defined less by ideological blocs than by pragmatic alignments. Countries across the Global South are recalibrating their foreign policies, weighing the costs of US unpredictability against the benefits of Chinese engagement. For many, the choice is not about endorsing authoritarianism but about securing economic growth and strategic autonomy in a multipolar world.

China’s ascent is not without challenges. Its assertiveness in the South China Sea, its human-rights record, its belligerence on its borders with India, its enormous stake in Pakistan, and its readiness to weaponise its monopoly over essential materials like rare earths, remain sources of concern. Yet in the current geopolitical climate, these issues are often overshadowed by the broader appeal of stability and investment. As Trump continues to dismantle the architecture of American-led globalism, Beijing’s narrative gains traction — not because it is universally embraced, but because it fills a void.

The post-war order was neither unchallengeable nor immutable. It was a construct of its time, shaped by the exigencies of Cold War rivalry and the promise of liberal democracy. Today, that promise is under strain. The world is not returning to the bipolar standoff of the 20th century, but entering a more fluid and contested phase — one where power is diffuse, partnerships are transactional, and legitimacy is up for grabs

In this landscape, the United States faces a choice. It can continue down the path of insular nationalism, ceding influence to rivals and alienating allies. Or it can re-engage with the world, rebuild trust, and adapt its leadership to the realities of a multipolar age. The cost of restoration will be high, but the cost of abdication may be higher still.

As speeches echo across the diplomatic platform of the United Nations General Assembly this month, the usual bromides are giving way to the substance of transformation. The post-war consensus may be fading, but the contest for the future is only beginning. More on this next week.

The writer, a former UN Under Secretary-General and former Minister of State for External Affairs, chairs the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs.