Opinion Rafale comes home
The next step for India is to build design and development capacity
The next step for India is to build design and development capacity>
The much delayed process of aircraft acquisition and the excruciatingly tough trials to evaluate the six aircraft on offer has finally led to the shortlisting of the French Rafale as the key MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) for the coming years. But there are many items on the acquisition chart to be ticked still,and knowing the complex business of the arms market,the possibilities of unknown roadblocks or at least hiccups may still have to be overcome although the end result may remain unchanged from what today looks like the final choice. The process of acquiring the 126 MMRCA,often termed by the media as the mother of all deals (though the India-Russia deal on Sukhois Su-30MKI for over 300 aircraft,with a follow up T-50 fifth generation fighter,would then have to be called the father of all deals),has taken a long time during which ever more combat aircraft have completed their design life,leading to a continuing drop in the combat force level of the Indian Air Force.
But this process,systematic and almost scientific even if rather prolonged,should also finally lay the ghost of Bofors that has been the major cause of delays in defence modernisation for the past quarter century to rest. Its utility would last only if the principles on which the shortlisting and final contract are signed became a regular procedure even for aircraft designed and produced domestically. But this can only happen if the armed forces,who are the most crucial stakeholders in arms acquisitions,become an integrated part of the process from the design to the end state.
The selection of the Rafale as the IAFs next MMRCA still has quite a distance to go,although professionally it proves that the IAFs expectations of acquiring more of the Mirage 2000,since the end of 2000,was professionally sound. At another level,though this factor did not play a part in the current procedure,France has been a reliable partner in Indias quest for self-reliance in combat aircraft except that previous attempts to manufacture them in India had not borne fruit. The first lesson in diversifying sources of arms was learnt when India mobilised and deployed its armed forces on the border in early 1951 in response to Pakistans threat of war. And the aircraft selected was the Dassaults Ouragon in preference to the British Meteor. US arms aid to Pakistan after 1954 led to an expansion of the IAF and the first fighter selected was the Dassaults Mystere IVA,the most heavily armed combat aircraft that the IAF has had till the Su-30MKI joined the fleet. Unfortunately,this process did not lead to licence manufacture even after the Mirage 2000-H was acquired in early 1980s; and,meanwhile,the French preferred to sell the Mirage III and V to Pakistan. Dassault acquired great experience with delta-wing fighters and this now showed up in the Rafale.
There is still a long process ahead in negotiating the terms of the contract where offsets no doubt will constitute a key factor. It would be a gross error to think of the offsets only in terms of the financial element in that 50 per cent of the cost would have to be ploughed back into Indian industry and economy. We need to understand that the reason we are buying the
MMRCA is that we were not able to design and develop it in spite of having manufactured and overhauled thousands of aircraft and engines in our aircraft industry which has grown into a colossus over the past 72 years. The offsets process must be seen as a lever to acquire greater capability in design and development of aircraft and its systems. After all,the Rafale has already been designed and over 160 aircraft have been manufactured and are in service with the French Air Force,some of which were employed in the strikes over Libya.
But it is obvious that with a life of nearly three to four decades (in actual service),the Rafale will require upgrades in technological terms to a large number of its systems and sub-systems like radar,ECM systems,etc in another 10-15 years from now. The research and development of such upgrades (and the prioritisation of such steps) must be planned now in conjunction with Dassault and other manufacturers of such systems. The crux of the matter is that such upgrades must be developed and applied in India by the OEM (original equipment manufacturer) in partnership with Indian entities,preferably in the private sector,which would also help raise the technological and design capabilities in aviation and other sectors and in turn energise Indian industry and economy. In the first case,such an approach may require 70:30 partnerships led by the OEM,which should lead to Indian companies taking on 70 per cent share by the time the aircraft gets ready for the next major upgrades 10-15 years later.
These joint ventures would form the base for design and development of systems and components for military and civil aviation in India for the future. The government must avoid the temptation of accepting offsets in the shape of already designed systems like mission simulator,as has been done in the case of Lockheed C-130 Super Hercules; or that of seeking to do everything in and through HAL. Building design and development capacity and capability in a whole range of weapons connected systems and components/ spares is the route that will make any mother of deals productive and cost-effective in the decades ahead.
The writer,a retired Air Commodore,is Director,Centre for Air Power Studies,express@expressindia.com
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