Opinion Pratap Bhanu Mehta writes: On China, government needs to be more forthcoming

There is a lot of speculation that India’s increasing engagement and military exercises with the US are a proximate cause of concern. But here is the puzzle. If the concern is to keep India out of US ambit, then surely China’s position on India is the surest way of achieving that goal. After all, even Nehru was, according to S Gopal, forced by the Chinese actions in late 1962 to say that “there was no non-alignment vis-a-vis China.” In a way, the needle India is trying to thread, that it has an independent foreign policy (which it does), but it is one that does not preclude taking whatever steps necessary for its security, seems to cut no diplomatic ice with the Chinese. In short, if China’s view of India in relation to the US is over determined, the possibility of any manoeuvring on the strategic level becomes zero.

It is also the case that India’s growing size and power will eventually collide with the status quo in the relationship with China. It has happened, in a literal sense, on the border, with infrastructure development. But there are three other parallels with the Sixties that come to mind. The Galwan clash predates the war in Ukraine. But in the Sixties the sense that the West was distracted with Russia was seen as providing cover for China. India’s bid to position itself as a kind of leader of the developing world, its old Vishwaguru ambitions that Nehru pursued more assiduously than this regime can even imagine, was always a threat to China’s global positioning. It is hard to imagine the Chinese regime, in its current context, comfortable with an India triumph on the global diplomatic stage in the context of G-20. Its strategy is to keep the world on edge. But finally, regime type matters. Democracies can often engage in their own imperial overreach. But it is also the case that as power gets more personalised in China, nationalism is a greater source of legitimacy, and paranoia about the outside world’s intentions gathers steam, the temptation to keep the world off kilter and guessing grows.

At the moment, China is, in some senses, like a diplomatic stonewall. Dealing with China will require far-reaching political, military and economic changes, and a move away from the current incremental status quo. If we are in the long haul with no prospect for reciprocity from China, then our trade and development choices have to reflect reality. The ground will have to be prepared. On the other hand, if we are engaging diplomatically at some point, there will also have to be thinking beyond the current status quo. India is also moving diplomatically in its relations with other countries. But we need a clearer assessment of how many of our new initiatives are about political symbolism rather than actually securing the foundations of our power and security.

It is important to ensure that India’s domestic politics does not diminish our policy options. In framing these options, this truth must be acknowledged: Both China and Pakistan have not been wrong in thinking that India’s domestic politics makes the possibility of India offering anything other than consolidation of the status quo very slim. It is clear that we need a new equilibrium with China. India can argue, justifiably, that the onus is not on India to make concessions. But if we reflect on our 75-year history, we also have to understand that we have seldom been in no position to offer any deals that move beyond the status quo. Defending ourselves so that we negotiate from a position of strength is vital. But in a fluid context, not building a national consensus on what deals we could live with if the opportunity arises, will disable India from taking the diplomatic initiative.

But this will require a different style of domestic politics that is oriented to building a consensus based on truth. While there is a great effort to focus everyone’s attention on the China challenge, there is also a curious attempt to disguise the gravity. For one thing, the government has itself not been very forthcoming on the degree to which the Chinese might have altered the status quo on the border, and what our tactical accommodations have entailed. One can sympathise with the temptation to think that making these matters subject to open debate in Parliament might not only politicise them, but also cut down the room for diplomatic manoeuvre. But in this case, there is a suspicion that the government is more concerned about admitting any possible loss of territory or patrolling rights, because it might make it look politically weak. The government should proceed on the assumption that the greater forthrightness it shows, the more it will have the ability in the long run to carry the country with it.

The writer is contributing editor, The Indian Express