Opinion Memo of misunderstanding

Ijaz,then,apparently ardently believes the ISI is a perfidious and malign organisation and wants it cut down to size,but then he helps the ISI chief uncover evidence of a secret plot,of which Ijaz is apparently a part,to cut the ISI down to size with the help of the US.

Anything is possible in Pakistan,but some things are more likely than others.

To long-time observers of political machinations here,there is an element of the familiar to the latest political crisis to jolt the country. The boys in uniform appear to be up to their tricks again.

While Haqqani resigned on Tuesday,the vexed subject of civil-military relations has taken another very wrong turn and the reverberations could continue deep into the future.

In truth,however,the seeds of the latest trouble were sown by Asif Ali Zardari soon after he became president and the de facto civilian leader of the country.

After coming to power,Zardari did initially try to wrest some control from the army high command. Most famously,his government tried to put the ISI under the control of the interior ministry — an abortive attempt that lasted just a few hours — and speculated about Pakistan declaring a no-first-strike use of nuclear weapons before an Indian audience,speculation that was summarily dismissed by the army leadership.

Then,in the wake of the Mumbai attacks,the political leadership was inclined to send General Pasha to India,but was quickly vetoed by the military establishment.

Burned by these initial forays,Zardari soon chose a different tack: meek non-resistance. The accidental president,who until a year before he ascended to power,was most famous for being Benazir Bhutto’s husband and being epically corrupt,was out of his depth or perhaps just content to focus on a domestic political agenda. Either way,non-resistance was a choice with major ramifications.

The first sign of trouble came in March 2009,when General Ashfaq Kayani intervened behind the scenes to have Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry restored and to bring a peaceful end to the “long march” that Nawaz Sharif was leading to Islamabad for the restoration of Chaudhry and a handful of other judges sacked by the then president,Pervez Musharraf.

For his efforts,General Kayani was applauded domestically for demonstrating “statesmanship”,while politicians came off as a bunch of petty squabblers putting self-interest ahead of the country’s interests yet again.

The die had been cast and Zardari made a strategic retreat: he surrendered altogether the national security and foreign policy domains to the army high command in return for political stability and the continuity of his government.

That tacit bargain was a costly mistake. The army tolerated Zardari because the alternative,Sharif,was even less palatable and direct military intervention was untenable so soon after the Musharraf era had ended amidst widespread anger and disillusionment over the army’s political role. Beyond that,however,the high command had no intention of yielding any space to civilians; in fact,it was out to grab more space for itself.

So when the civilians negotiated a landmark multi-billion dollar,non-military aid package with the US,known locally as the Kerry-Lugar bill,the army issued a statement expressing “concern” over some clauses in the US legislation that linked the aid to increased civilian control over the armed forces and Pakistan’s cooperation with the international community on terrorism-related matters.

Fast forward to 2011 and memogate,and the price the country is paying for Zardari’s choices is becoming clearer. An accidental president with suspect democratic credentials has done what he’s considered necessary to achieve his one-point agenda: complete his government’s term.

But while close to achieving his goal,Zardari has made critical compromises that have allowed the army high command to pursue its agenda unimpeded. And when fate has intervened and offered historic opportunities,as happened in the wake of the May 2 raid that took out Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad unleashing a storm of criticism against the army,Zardari has baulked at recovering space for the civilians.

That the army will never willingly cede ground to the civilians is clear. So,it seems,is Pakistan’s misfortune in having a political leadership that either doesn’t know how to claw back space for the civilians or is unwilling to do so due to myopic self-interest.

The writer,an assistant editor with ‘Dawn’,is based in Karachi
express@expressindia.com