Opinion G20: From India to Brazil to South Africa, a Global South arc that must be sustained

India’s 2023 G20 presidency and the New Delhi summit delivered two structurally essential outcomes: The African Union’s admission as a permanent member, addressing a long-standing representational imbalance; and the elevation of Digital Public Infrastructure, including digital ID systems and payment platforms, as a global public good for inclusive service delivery. India also advanced a case for reforming multilateral development banks, pushing for expanded lending capacity and climate-aligned mandates, and positioned these shifts not as emerging economy demands but as central to global economic resilience.

Brazil’s presidency in 2024 took this agenda and pushed it deeper into the social domain. With hunger, inequality, and governance reform as central themes, Brazil placed distributional outcomes at the heart of macroeconomic discussions. Its flagship initiative — the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty — signalled a willingness to anchor the G20’s legitimacy in real-world impact. Brazil also broadened representation by including its South American neighbours, the Mercosur economies, in G20 conversations and sustaining focus on debt distress, climate justice, and financing for transition.

South Africa’s 2025 presidency has built on this continuity with an explicitly African framing. “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability” as its theme reflects the development-first approach of the previous two years but locates it within Africa’s own priorities: Debt vulnerability, industrialisation, food security, and a just energy transition. Pretoria has also worked to ensure that the AU’s first full year as a G20 member translates into substantive agenda-setting. Early deliberations have emphasised cross-border payments, critical minerals, agricultural resilience, and disaster-risk financing — issues central to African economies but equally relevant to the wider Global South.

The Johannesburg summit presents a critical opportunity to lock in continuity across three fronts central to the Global South’s G20 agenda. On development finance, it can push forward overdue reforms to expand multilateral development bank capital, attract private investment, and accelerate debt relief, especially for countries facing prolonged restructuring delays. In terms of digital public infrastructure, it can help advance global norms on interoperability, standards, and impact measurement, ensuring DPI remains a cornerstone of inclusive development. And on industrialisation and energy transition, Johannesburg can reinforce the case for flexible, adequately financed pathways tailored to developing economies, especially in Africa, where access to technology, concessional finance, and climate funding remains essential.

In effect, the three presidencies have functioned as a relay. India shaped the architecture, Brazil deepened the distributional lens, and South Africa is now attempting to consolidate and institutionalise these gains before the leadership baton moves back to the G7.

But for all the optimism, there is an undercurrent of uncertainty about what comes next. South Africa will hand over the G20 presidency to the United States in 2026, ending the string of emerging economies holding the presidency. Can the geoeconomic momentum built by the Global South survive the handover? Or will the agenda snap back to business-as-usual under a developed nation’s watch? Early indications are worrying. US President Donald Trump – who returned to office in January 2025 – declined to send officials to Johannesburg, calling South Africa’s G20 presidency a “total disgrace”.

A developed-country chair is likely to reorient the G20 agenda toward geopolitical risks, supply-chain security, and industrial-policy competition. While these are legitimate priorities, they could overshadow the developmental thrust of the past three years. The risk is not that the US will reverse commitments on paper, but that development-first issues lose political attention and bureaucratic momentum.

Yet, the shift is not predetermined. The US has strategic reasons to maintain parts of the Global South agenda. MDB (Multilateral Development Bank) reform, for example, aligns with Washington’s interest in offering credible alternatives to contemporary financing models. While climate finance has bipartisan geopolitical relevance, if digital public goods are framed around standard-setting and interoperability, they can align with broader US technological objectives. The extent to which the 2023-2025 agenda survives will depend on how effectively India, Brazil, South Africa, and other emerging economies engage the US presidency. If India and its partners can hold the line, the G20 may continue to serve as a forum for inclusive economic governance. If not, it risks reverting to older patterns, pushing the Global South to seek influence through other channels.

The writer is a fellow and lead, World Economies and Sustainability at the Centre for New Economic Diplomacy (CNED) at Observer Research Foundation