Opinion Fukushima files

International experts had already begun to point fingers at the serious gaps in the Daiichi reactors’ record of safety and emergency preparedness. But it is a different thing for Japan’s own parliamentary panel to pronounce on the “multitude of errors and wilful negligence”. The Chernobyl accident never led to any such findings,even years later. Closer home,high-level probes on disasters are seldom made public.

The parliamentary commission report is severe about the woeful manner in which authorities and the operator responded to the catastrophe that unfolded after March 11,2011,when the tsunami hit Japan. A flawed plan for the evacuation of almost 150,000 people exposed them to radiation. A resident of Okuma is quoted in an appendix of the report: “If there was even a word about a nuclear power plant accident when evacuation was ordered… we could have taken our valuables with us or locked the house up… We had to run with nothing but the clothes we had on.”

Post Fukushima,a number of steps were taken in Japan,such as a complete reform of the regulatory body and the oversight mechanism. To this,the report only says that merely “replacing people or changing the names of institutions” will not do.

The report says that regulators did not monitor the nuclear plants,and shirked responsibility by letting the operators observe regulations voluntarily. The regulators were not independent from the operators or political authority. Required expertise was also missing on the part of the regulators,as was the commitment to enforce nuclear safety. A damning indictment is reserved for the operator,Tepco,which is said to have manipulated a cosy relationship with the regulators and made them toothless while bureaucracy at the powerful ministry of economy,trade and industry drove nuclear policy. Laws and regulations on nuclear power were never reviewed comprehensively to conform to international standards. Neither did they take lessons from previous accidents. Predictable risks were not factored in as a result of such practices.

The report underlines the lack of clear guidelines on the emergency response of concerned parties. It also pointed to a bias in existing regulations,which promoted nuclear power over public safety and health.

In fact,the report echoes conclusions voiced by international experts. For instance,the analysis last March by experts from the Carnegie Endowment,James Action and Mark Hibbs,concluded that “had Tepco and the nuclear safety agency followed international standards and best practice,the Fukushima accident would have been prevented”. These experts claimed that Tepco knew about tsunami risks,had even done computer simulations,but still failed to act. This was in contrast with experiences in other countries,such as France — in December 1999 the Blayais nuclear power plant was flooded. European countries drew the right lessons from the French experience and equipped their plants with adequate emergency electricity supply to eliminate coolant failure and a consequent meltdown.

Some of the most established names in the nuclear field — Sidney Drell,George P. Shultz and Steven Andreasen wrote in the journal Science that “Fukushima demonstrates the fragility of the civil nuclear enterprise”. They regretted that “strong,independent regulatory agencies are not the norm in many countries” and stressed the need to protest against “regulatory capture” by people in government,regulatory authorities and industry for vested interest. The “regulatory capture” theme figures prominently in the Japanese report as well.

Japan has done immense service to international community by admitting to its deficiencies. There is also a cultural confession in the report — reflexive obedience,unwillingness to question authority and insularity are held responsible for what it calls a man-made disaster. But since these traits are scarcely unique to any particular nationality,such Japanese politesse cannot disguise the more direct conclusion of the report — concrete action,which could and should have been taken to prevent the disaster,was missing. This verdict,that the disaster was preventable,could help temper the adverse impact Fukushima has had on nuclear power prospects worldwide.

The observation on regulators lacking expertise and thus compromising independence from operators poses a challenge to many countries,particularly where governments run nuclear enterprise and the private sector or academia is still not up to it. While insularity is counter-productive,taking in outsiders on a regulatory body may not bridge the credibility gap. The question of how to raise awareness and transparency in a constructive manner is likely to dog nuclear debate.

The writer is former ambassador to Austria and governor on the IAEA board
express@expressindia.com