The run-up to the 2024 parliamentary election is witnessing pendulum swings, and competing and conflicting perceptions. The needle has moved from the emergence of the INDIA alliance wielding the demand for a caste census, to perceptions of a BJP advantage after the inauguration of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya. This narrative is being challenged by south-based regional parties asking the Centre for their share in federal funds. Amid these developments comes the Punjab farmers’ bid to march towards Delhi.
The stage is being set once again ahead of the election as several farmer unions have backed the protest. The state machinery has once again deployed its forces at Delhi’s borders, and they have been heavily barricaded. However, the current protest differs from the 2020 farmers’ protests in several aspects — such as the nature of demands, the organisations involved and the governments’ response.
The ongoing protests are spearheaded by the Samyukt Kisan Morcha led by Jagjit Singh Dhallewal and Sarwan Singh Pandher, who were not prominent in the previous farmers’ protest. Two groups led by Darshan Pal and Balbir Singh Rajewal have given a separate call for a Bharat Bandh on February 16. BKU (Ugrahan) has given a separate call for Rail Roko against excessive use of state force in Haryana on February 15.
The farmers’ agitation launched in 2020 was led by a conglomerate of 32 ideologically competing organisations and it was not Punjab-centric. It saw a large participation of farmers from Western Uttar Pradesh and Haryana as well as Punjab. The current protest is more pronounced in Punjab, as Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh have remained mostly silent so far. The unions led by Rakesh Tikait and Gurnam Singh Charuni have decided not to be a part of it.
Earlier, the protest movement also drew wide support from civil society activists, artists, professionals, and even retired and serving civil servants, teachers and students. The radical right-wing also brought into it their own narratives, but they remained on the margins. The fact that the movement was led by progressive farmers and supported by moderate supporters, irrespective of their religious and caste affiliations, ensured that the role of radical right-wing politics remained limited. The present protest does not have widespread support and has overtones of identity politics.
Today, the three main factions of farmers’ unions have not united under one banner — they are competing with each other in a game of one-upmanship. The SKM (non-political) took the lead to edge out other factions and entered into negotiations, with the support of the Punjab Government, with the Central Government, to overtake other kisan unions.
As far as the demands are concerned, the protests appear to be more structured than before. They include seeking legal guarantees of MSP, demanding India’s withdrawal from the World Trade Organisation, waivers of farm loans, implementation of the Swaminathan Commission’s recommendations, pensions for farmers and farm labourers, withdrawal of cases filed against farmers during the 2020-21 protests and compensation for farmers who died during that period, justice for victims of the Lakhimpur Kheri incident, along with an emphasis on the promises made by BJP in 2021 after the repeal of the farm laws.
On the other hand, the government’s reaction to the current protest still seems reactionary, as the borders are being heavily barricaded and Section 144 is in effect at the Ghazipur, Singhu, and Tikri borders. Internet services have been blocked in several regions of Punjab and Haryana, and Rajasthan has sealed its borders with Punjab and Haryana along with the imposition of prohibitory orders in several districts. Although the government initiated the negotiation with the farmers, prior to their “Dilli Chalo” announcement, it has not yet responded to the promises it made to farmers in 2021.
However, the protest site has witnessed the use of tear gas, drones dropping smoke bombs, stone-pelting, traffic snarls, seizure of vehicles and detention of farmers by the Haryana Police — ignoring lessons from last time that the excessive use of force might provide legitimacy to those who want to radicalise the protest.
There were other lessons as well from the farmers’ protest in 2020, which ended in farmers’ victory but in which more than 700 kisans lost their lives. It was the first and longest struggle against the economic reform agenda initiated in the 1990s.
It is paradoxical that agribusiness is making huge profits while the producers of food are starving. But to characterise the crisis of agriculture as that of foodgrain not finding markets or farmers reduced to penury or the water table receding is reductionism. The crisis goes much deeper.
Food is politics. It cannot be addressed by administrative and legal measures alone. The resolution of issues relating to food sovereignty, food security and the livelihood of the farmers requires political will. The Centre should have engaged all political parties to find long-term solutions rather than leaving space for it being turned into a competitive vote-catching exercise. To make farming globally competitive, farming has to be subsidised. To sustain their commercial farms, even developed countries give huge subsidies.
Another lesson from the last time that the farmers took to the streets was that the government should enact laws after consultations with the stakeholders. Otherwise, it produces tragedy for the people and embarrassment for the leadership. Having withdrawn the three farm laws, the Centre had proposed to set up a committee to find ways and means for providing statutory backing to the Minimum Support Price (MSP). The delayed initiative on this promise has provided a reason for kisans to launch their protest now. The perception that the political leadership only responds to protests and listens to the voices of the people only on the eve of elections has acted as a trigger.
The writer is chairperson, Institute for Development and Communication, Chandigarh