Opinion When defence technology may not be worth the money

The F-35 is reportedly the world’s most technologically advanced fighter aircraft. However, technology comes with its own problems. The April 2024 report by the GAO notes that with an average fleet mission capable rate of just 57 per cent, the F-35 Programme is “costing more and doing less”, and the fleet isn’t meeting the performance goals for reliability, availability and maintainability. In July 2023, the United States Air Force (USAF) had, in the absence of upgrades, stopped accepting the F-35A aircraft; it resumed acceptance in July 2024 while withholding funds till the same was completed.

The USAF had found that in a short-range dog fight, the F-35 with a max speed of Mach-1.6 and far less energy than the older F-16D, was simply “out-turned”. The response was that the F-35 is not optimised for within-visual-range aerial dogfights, but would use its “stealth” to remain undiscovered at long distances from enemy aircraft while engaging them with beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles. Critics, however, contend that stealth fighters are prone to detection by infrared search and track systems and low-bandwidth radars, and also begin to appear on X-band targeting radars at closer ranges.

Presently, the Indian Air Force (IAF) operates 31 combat squadrons against an authorised strength of 42 squadrons. This air power deficit is being aggravated by an ageing fleet and delays in key indigenous projects, particularly the fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-2. The 36 4.5-generation Rafale are the most advanced combat jets in the IAF’s inventory. With Pakistan’s recent fast-tracking acquisition of 40 Chinese J-35 stealth fighters, the IAF is seeking to acquire over 110 combat aircraft to strengthen its air capability. But cogent reasons suggest the F-35 is not for India.

Firstly, it’s a grossly expensive aircraft beset with problems – the fleet has suffered six known accidents thus far. With a per flying hour cost of $33,600, the USAF is spending $6.6 million annually to operate and sustain each F-35A, well above the original goal of $4.1 million.

Secondly, recent warfare tends to clarify that the days of piloted fighter aircraft are numbered and the future envisages unmanned aircraft. In a piloted aircraft, a large amount of space is utilised to accommodate and facilitate the pilot and his/her functions; this augments the size and also adds weight to the aircraft. Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) are already proving that it is possible to carry out precision strikes at long ranges as well as perform most functions of a pilot. Besides, UCAVs can carry the same payload in a much smaller size.

The US also has a tendency to control how its weapon platforms can be utilised by its “allies”. That the F-16s and associated armaments of the Pakistani Air Force remain under the US’s direct watch provides a context.

Buying a limited number of F-35s only widens the IAF’s inventory but without increasing overall fleet efficiency, and operational and indigenous capabilities. The original deal for Rafale (126 aircraft) had envisioned technology transfer and part make-in-India; the truncated deal (36 aircraft) has none of that. Finally, there is the detrimental effect of such a buy on India’s fifth-generation AMCA, the nascent Indian defence industry, and projects like make-in-India-for-India, Atmanirbhar, etc.

A RAND simulation of a US-China war had premised that the PLA Air Force could use large swarms of inferior fighter aircraft to simply overwhelm the lesser number of US stealth fighters – which brings back the intense debate on Lanchester equations and the associated “quality versus quantity”. Besides, the F-35 also seems emblematic of what George Friedman labels as “senility” in major weapon systems.

A prime indicator of a weapon system turning “senile” is when the cost of merely protecting it starts to outrun the operational capability it can deliver. This concept is best explained by the constant jousting between main battle tanks and anti-tank weapons — each time a better-protected tank gets deployed, an improved anti-tank weapon is invented, leading to re-designing and production of more expensive tanks – which are now being destroyed by low-cost drones. The same seems to be true for piloted stealth fighter aircraft – it is not possible for “stealth” aircraft to continue to enjoy a low-observable advantage. China claims it has a new infrared sensor-carrying airship drone which can detect F-35-type aircraft from 2,000 km. While the increasing technological complexity of the F-35 gives an illusion of a sophisticated platform, in reality, it’s an indicator of its vulnerability – and whose operating costs could become an unbearable burden even as its effectiveness declines.

The writer is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army