Opinion C Raja Mohan writes on PM Modi’s Asia tour: Expect rhetoric from SCO meet in China, progress in Japan

India’s central challenge with Washington today lies in trade. On this front, Moscow and Beijing offer little respite. In 2024, Russia and China imported just $5 billion and $15 billion worth of goods from India, respectively, while running surpluses of $60 billion and $100 billion. By contrast, India’s exports to the US in 2024 stood at $88 billion — more than four times the combined figure for Russia and China — and a surplus of about $45 billion in India’s favour.

India’s manufacturing industries remain dangerously vulnerable to China. Beijing’s bans on rare earth magnets — they are crucial to India’s automobile sector — as well as its refusal to sell tunnelling equipment for Himalayan projects, and the withdrawal of Chinese engineers from Apple’s iPhone production in India have starkly exposed the vulnerabilities created by three decades of neglect in industrial policy. Neither “Make in India” nor the current campaign to “buy swadeshi” will quickly enhance Delhi’s strategic autonomy from Beijing. That India is now compelled to seek relief from China on specific trade embargoes only underscores the deepening of economic reliance in the near term.

Meanwhile, Russia’s role in India’s energy security has become contentious. The Biden administration once viewed India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil as a stabilising factor. Trump’s White House, however, treats it as leverage to compel Delhi to cut energy ties with Moscow. What appeared to be a boon in 2022 has now turned India into collateral damage in the confrontation between Russia and the West.

The SCO is often portrayed as an inner-Asian club standing up to American dominance. That aspiration is undermined, though, by severe internal contradictions. Beyond Delhi’s fraught ties with Beijing, its disputes with Islamabad continue to cast a shadow. Though counterterrorism was one of the forum’s founding goals, the SCO has been unwilling to censure Pakistan, thanks to China’s protection. Delhi, in turn, has highlighted the forum’s double standards on terrorism. Nor does India endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

It will not be surprising if Islamabad raises the pitch for a dialogue with India at Tianjin. Improved ties with the US and a deepening partnership with China have given a new wind to Pakistan’s stalled diplomacy in recent years. With Turkey and Azerbaijan, Pakistan’s close allies, also present at the SCO, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif will have many opportunities for photo-ops and political posturing.

To its discomfort, India will also find almost all its neighbours (except Dhaka and Thimphu) present at Tianjin. Afghanistan is an observer, while the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka are all associated with the SCO. China is supporting Dhaka’s interest in joining the forum. With SAARC effectively moribund (it has not had a summit since 2014), Beijing has quietly drawn much of the Subcontinent into the SCO orbit. China has gone further by promoting its own minilateral formats. In Kabul, Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted a trilateral with Afghanistan and Pakistan last week. Earlier this year, Beijing convened talks with Pakistan and Bangladesh, and it continues an informal track with Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Through these initiatives, Beijing is defining itself as South Asia’s most consequential external power and a “benign benefactor”. In Islamabad, Wang stressed the Subcontinent’s “immense development potential and resilience”, promising that China would remain a “trustworthy partner and strong support”. In framing the Subcontinent’s future as one of accelerated development under China’s stewardship, Beijing seeks to entrench itself as both economic engine and political stabiliser if not arbiter of South Asia’s destiny.

The US, too, is signalling ambitions in South Asia. Trump’s designation of his new ambassador to India, Sergio Gor, as also his “special envoy” for South Asia underscores Washington’s intent to compete for influence with China. As China and the US develop regional visions for South Asia, Delhi risks losing strategic primacy.

Still, the forum offers opportunities. Renewed discussions with Beijing on rules of the road for peace and tranquillity on the disputed border and resolving parts of the boundary issue would be welcome steps toward a framework of sensible neighbourly relations. Any expectations of sweeping breakthroughs, however, would be unrealistic.

If Tianjin is about stabilising ties with China, Tokyo is about elevating India’s strategic partnership with Japan. New initiatives in defence, trade, and technology cooperation are likely to be announced in Tokyo.

PM Modi’s talks with the Japanese leadership will give India a first-hand sense of the unfolding disruptions in Northeast Asia. Since his return to office, Trump’s policies have shaken America’s longstanding allies to the core. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan now face high tariffs, harsh demands for greater defence spending, and Trump’s extortionist pressures on transferring wealth and technology to the US. While still dependent on US protection, these allies are looking to explore greater self-reliance and diversification. After the focus in recent years on working with the US in Asia, India would want to enhance its independent role in Asia, creating space for expanded strategic cooperation with Japan and Northeast Asia more broadly.

There is no doubt Delhi’s continental ambition will remain constrained by geography and unresolved disputes with China and Pakistan. In contrast, its bilateral partnerships with Asia’s maritime periphery are ripe for expansion. Expect soaring rhetoric from Tianjin on rebooting the regional and global order, but look out for tangible progress in the strategic partnership with Tokyo.

The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express