Opinion An inevitable victory

Thus,when political analysts and the media highlighted the infighting within the Congress and the confusion over ticket distribution,it served to introduce an element of uncertainty about the results and inject some excitement into what would have been a dry narrative about the Congress’s inevitable victory. However,the troubles the Congress experienced over the past month are structural in nature. For instance,the Congress historically hasn’t depended on nominating strong candidates to win elections. Rather,star campaigners have got even dummy candidates elected. In the intensely competitive political environment of the past decade,star campaigners — be it national leaders like Rahul Gandhi or state leaders like Siddaramaiah — do not possess such mass appeal.

Moreover,the Congress doesn’t possess the nimbleness to recruit winnable candidates,which is a skill both the BJP and the JD(S) have demonstrated over the past decade. In a post-ideological era of politics,winnable candidates are like migratory birds flocking to the next appealing destination. But the Congress has other compulsions. It has to accommodate multiple social groups and their representatives in its slate of candidates. So,more than the winnability of each candidate,the Congress often has to focus on sending an appropriate political message to its base.

It seems that the Congress gameplan depended on working within these constraints and the party decided not to entertain outsiders,especially those associated with the previous BJP government. That meant it didn’t have very good candidates,especially in Bangalore city,where its own base has steadily declined. Still,the Congress strategy seemed to be to build a solid ground game in each constituency and benefit from two developments: first,exploit the resentment that backward caste groups felt towards the BJP. Second,the Congress also hoped to benefit from the split in the Lingayat vote in central and northern Karnataka.

The results show that the Congress managed to raise its vote share by 6 per cent across the state and enhanced its seat tally by one-third. While it was in a dogfight in the old Mysore region with JD(S),in the rest of the state — coastal and central Karnataka,Bombay Karnataka and Hyderabad Karnataka regions — the party made significant gains.

That,in itself,is a significant commentary on the regional imbalances in Karnataka. Over-developed,urbanised southern Karnataka has intense political rivalries,and doesn’t allow for wild swings away from the incumbent government. The under-developed northern regions,still seeking state assistance for economic opportunities and development,abandoned the BJP entirely and plumped for the Congress. The coastal region is somewhat of an anomaly,since more than developmental issues,the Sangh Parivar’s Hindutva experiments,especially aggression against minorities and women,seem to have catapulted the Congress to victory.

Equally impressive is the sheer political talent the Congress has in its ranks to form a ministry. With the exception of KPCC president G. Parameshwara,all the major Congress leaders with vast administrative experience have won.

If the Congress is returning to power on its own after nearly a decade,the BJP is in a shambles. It has lost more than two-thirds of its assembly seats and nearly 12 per cent of its vote share. More significantly,the BJP’s social coalition of Lingayats,several backward castes and scheduled castes and urban voters is decimated. If B.S. Yeddyurappa and B. Sriramulu took away the Lingayat and backward caste support,dissidence,scandals — from corruption to the sexual escapades of ministers and MLAs — and bad governance alienated BJP’s core urban support.

Its governance centred on aggressive welfare programmes targeted at specific groups,and symbolic gestures such as separate agricultural budgets or distributing cash to mathas and caste groups. Its development agenda seemed limited to periodically hosting the global investor’s meet and touting commitments made by various industrialists. While the three BJP chief ministers often spoke of the Gujarat model of development,their focus remained on managing dissidence within the party,leaving little time for actual governance. Substantial problems,especially concerning urban civic infrastructure and power,remained unsolved. Sometimes it seemed the BJP ministers were keener on setting up their own private industrial enterprises than handling their ministries.

If,prior to the elections,the BJP struggled to put up credible candidates in over 50 constituencies,the results show the majority of its candidates in southern Karnataka failing to secure their deposits. No surprise,then,the JD(S) has tied with the BJP to emerge as the second-largest party in the legislature. Its performance in the Vokkaliga-dominated old Mysore region has been quite spectacular. H. D. Deve Gowda and his sons,especially H.D. Kumaraswamy,assiduously cultivated their base by extending state services,especially in irrigation,education and infrastructure,in the old Mysore region. The JD(S) hoped for a hung assembly in which it could have shared power with either the BJP or the Congress. While that didn’t materialise,Kumaraswamy remains relevant — more so than Yeddyurappa and other regional leaders.

Also noteworthy is the failure of non-mainstream political actors to make an impact. Loksatta candidates,appealing to middle class urban voters on issues of governance and public policy,failed to make an impact. The only exception is the election from Melukote of K.S.Puttannaih,the charismatic farmers’ leader.

The writer teaches history at the Karnataka State Open University