Opinion After Article 370 verdict, Centre and Ladakh need to be on the same page

A year later, when the initial euphoria died down, discontent surfaced. The UT conferment came with no alternate protection clause and no legislative provisions for enacting local laws. This was contrary to the expectation that henceforth Ladakh would shape its destiny. Ladakh feared that the UT status would open the door to an influx of outsiders that would, in turn, change the region’s demography and identity.

At the heart of Ladakh’s demand is power, which was linked to the status of the pre-existing governance body, Ladakh Autonomous Hill District Councils (LAHDC), that earlier functioned as a legislative body with financial powers to micromanage local affairs. With the UT status, their powers got shifted to the lieutenant governor and his apparatus. The elected Council members felt politically disempowered. People started feeling alienated.

Such fears prompted the locals to demand a Bodoland-like status to include Ladakh in the Sixth Schedule of Article 244(2) and 275(1) of the Constitution, presently in operation in 10 tribal districts of Northeastern states that have provisions for autonomous district councils with legislative power to make their own laws. It triggered the “People’s Movement for the Sixth Schedule for Ladakh in 2020”, supported by a range of political, social and religious outfits. Its apex body formed a rare unity with the Kargil-based KDA to carry forward their demands of statehood, Sixth Schedule provision, employment and separate parliamentary constituencies for Leh and Kargil.

The stalemate between the Centre and Ladakhi civil societies continues for the fourth year now. The general contention is that Ladakh’s long-pending demand for revocation of Article 370 and separation from J&K have been met. Why would its leaders then want to tread the same weary protectionist path under the Sixth Schedule ambit?

The confusion so far seems driven less by politics than by aspiration. It has less to do with the government’s negative intent and more to do with a lack of clarity and articulation. It is an upshot of the rhetorical hyperbole that went into the unmaking of J&K. The government needs to dispel Ladakh’s lingering anger which is likely to intensify after the SC verdict. Politically, for the BJP, to put the clock back to pre-2019 position would be to risk backlashes. The Home Minister has met Ladakhi leaders several times since 2022. The government seems to be treading carefully, avoiding a “cut and paste” tribal policy for Ladakh, for which it is perhaps ready to grant a “Sixth Schedule-like” status under Article 371.

However, Ladakh seems to be unconvinced. Their demand for legal safeguard for culture and land is reasonable but that for protection under a tribal law appears hasty. As things stand, the MHA’s efforts are unlikely to quell the growing Ladakhi discontent.

Politically, the abrogation meant a reversal of Nehru’s policy. Article 370 kept Ladakh backward. Poor connectivity meant Ladakh remained isolated; its vast borderland with a scant population left it vulnerable to Chinese encroachment.

To be sure, Ladakh as a UT is still in infancy. But from the Centre’s point of view, Ladakh is no longer ignored. It has enhanced Ladakh’s budget from Rs 1,136 crores during 2019-20 to Rs 6,000 crores in 2022-23; central laws with required modifications are being aligned for the UT and its administration seems geared to implement big-ticket economic projects and ramp-up infrastructure and employment.

But despite these, four years since the abrogation, the Centre seems to lack any clear strategy to shape the UT. This crisis is a derivative of the poor understanding of the region and its complex ethnic, political, security, and border dimensions. It is also a failure of the political/leadership to manage public perception. The new bureaucratic structure was not backed by political mechanisms. The 2019 J&K Act, among others, underlined a provision for the L-G to be assisted by political advisor(s). It has been evaded. The KDA-Apex Body protest led to the Centre calling back the Lt. Governor R.K Mathur. Ladakh’s demand for the Sixth Schedule also comes in conflict with the BJP’s ideology of “one nation, one law”. It is too early to assess its long-term ramifications.

Internally, SC’s verdict to restore statehood for J&K will intensify Ladakh’s clamour for statehood. Externally, the abrogation of Article 370 struck a deadly blow to our hostile neighbours, calling out even China’s bluff. Beijing wants to alter the very nature of the conflict hitherto limited to LAC disputes, broadening the canvas of conflict. The abrogation of Article 370 exposed China’s duplicity, especially when its stake in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) has increased due to its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) commitment. The UT formation has certainly caused discomfort for China, especially after India has gone for rapid border-infrastructure building and military deployment in eastern Ladakh which China considers as the “root cause of tensions”. India’s Ladakh move will probably unsettle China for it furtively thought itself a third party to the J&K dispute due to its illegal occupation of 5,180 sq km of the Shaksgam Valley and 38,000 sq km in the Aksai Chin plateau.

Home Minister Amit Shah recently reiterated India’s position on PoK, asserting emphatically that it is a part of India and that no one can snatch it from us. It remains to be seen how the government will make a move on this front which involves Ladakh.

The writer, a former diplomat, has served in Eurasia