Worse will come

The nuclear deal8217;s domestic doubters are forever arguing India has given up too much. Would that they read what global doubters of the deal say: India has been given too much. A representative view is this leader from the latest issue of 8216;The Economist8217; that also criticises Japan and Australia for endorsing India8217;s post-deal nuclear plans. Since global sceptics, like 8216;The Economist8217;, ask for the deal to be blocked, domestic critics asking for a pause in negotiations should perhaps pause and reflect

Unless others stand up for the anti-nuclear rules

For India8217;s government, despite the hubbub in Parliament and barely veiled threats from its neighbour, Pakistan, the controversial deal it struck last month with America to allow civil nuclear co-operation between the two countries is already radiating success. Shinzo Abe, Japan8217;s prime minister, was in Delhi this week to cement a 8220;strategic partnership8221;, despite Japan8217;s decades-long discomfort with India8217;s bomb. Meanwhile, Australia8217;s cabinet, hitherto resolute in its refusal to sell uranium to any country outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and only to a select few within it, has taken its cue from America and agreed in principle to sell uranium to India, even though India hasn8217;t signed the NPT, and won8217;t.

India is breaking out of the nuclear quarantine imposed after its first 8220;peaceful8221; nuclear test in 1974. But for commerce to resume, it must first agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA which safeguards will apply to nuclear facilities it has designated 8220;civilian8221;. It will then need an exemption from the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG, which bars nuclear trade with countries, such as India, that refuse to apply such international safeguards to all their nuclear facilities. Some governments are deeply unhappy at carving an India-sized hole in the nuclear rules. But none has yet vetoed it.

Unlike North Korea and Iran, which signed the NPT and then violated its rules, India like Pakistan and Israel never signed the treaty; its bombs are not illegal. Since no one expects it to give them up, the Bush administration argues it is better to bring India in from the cold and have it take on similar responsibilities to the treaty8217;s five recognised nuclear powers: America, Britain, France, Russia and China. That, say the Americans, would be a net gain for non-proliferation.

This newspaper has long disputed that. Among other dangerous loopholes, some of which have widened since Congress gave its conditional go-ahead to the deal in December, India is pointedly not taking on the obligations and practices of the official five. Unlike them, it has refused to sign the test-ban treaty. Unlike them, it declines to end the production of fissile material 8212; uranium and plutonium 8212; for bombs.

America8217;s readiness to make an Indian exception to all the rules risks snapping two of the joists that support the global non-proliferation structure. At the IAEA, India wants the right not just to say which reactors can be inspected, but when. Such unprecedented laxity in India will make it hard to get others 8212; for example, Brazil, which already does some uranium enriching of its own 8212; to accept the tougher inspections that the IAEA wants as standard for all NPT members.

Likewise, the hard-won clarity of the NSG8217;s trade ban has helped maintain support for the NPT, despite the cheating antics of a few. Mere talk of fudging the rules last year encouraged Russia to break them, citing spurious 8220;safety8221; concerns as an excuse to sell India uranium fuel. China, unhappy at America8217;s coddling of India, is exploring more nuclear co-operation with Pakistan 8212; which in turn threatens to match India, should it step up weapons production or test again.

Sending precisely the wrong message

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Japan, the NPT member with the most capable nuclear industry outside the nuclear five, has told Iran and others that they should do as it does 8212; scrupulously observe all IAEA safeguards 8212; if they want to be trusted with nuclear technology. Exemptions for India will convey a different message: first get your bomb. Such rule-bending puts at risk the anti-nuclear regime that everyone else8217;s safety and security is built on. Governments at the NSG and the IAEA that are unhappy with this need to find the courage of their convictions, and block it.