Why did the IPKF fail?

The insurgency stage after the capture of Jaffna has been adequately described, but why the IPKF could not have brought it to a successful...

The insurgency stage after the capture of Jaffna has been adequately described, but why the IPKF could not have brought it to a successful conclusion has not been fully explained. Perhaps the author was being discreet and did not wish to tread on the vulnerable toes of senior officers at Army Headquarters, of politicians in New Delhi and Tamil Nadu, of the High Commissioner in Colombo, of the Tamil Nadu government whose sympathy was all along with the insurgents and of the intelligence services who were not able to provide timely and accurate information. He could have emphasised the fact that troops had been inducted into the theatre to carry out this operation without adequate training and equipment and lacking the proper logistic support.

Our troops have suffered heavy casualties in the operations in Sri Lanka. Why? The operation of the IPKF had not been the success they ought to have been. Why? The Indian Army is a professional army. It has served with great success in various theatres and in different kinds of operations in the past, including the insurgency operations in the Mizo Hills. Why then did it not have the same success in Sri Lanka?

All these questions have remained unanswered, and I can only attribute these failures to the following:

The political aim was uncertain, wavering and not firm.

Troops were inducted into the theatre piece-meal, untrained, improperly equipped and without proper logistics.

The Fighting Command had too many masters giving different orders and different assessments. Was it the Prime Minister issuing directions, was the Chief of Army Staff giving orders or was it the Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters? Were the assessments of the General Officer Commanding in Chief at Headquarters Southern Command to be accepted, or the views of the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo?

The Fighting Command and the troops were also cognisant of the fact that whereas they were operating against the Tamil insurgents, the insurgents were getting trained in India, were being supplied with large quantities of arms and equipment, money and moral support from Tamil Nadu. Surely, this could not but have had a deleterious effect on their morale?

And finally, the Fighting Command, which includes the soldiery, had the feeling that the Government of India was not certain as to what it wanted the IPKF to achieve.

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Here let me quote from the Bible:
8220;If the Trumpet give an uncertained sound, who shall prepare himself to the Battle.8221; The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians Chapter 14, Verse 8.This work should help those charged in the future with the responsibility of combating insurgency, and should awaken the public, our political masters, and senior officers at Armed Forces Headquarters whose duty it is to apprise the decision makers without fear of equivocation and in clear terms the problems and consequences of action which they may choose to order. Once the decision is made it is for the service chief to make his assessment, allocate resources and give in unmistakable terms his direction to the commander of troops responsible for the operation. He and he alone should issue instructions to the combat commander, who in turn must be responsible and answerable to him and no one else.

This was written as a foreword to Lt Gen Depinder Singh8217;s book, IPKF in Sri Lanka8217;. Submitted by Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh retd for this column