Talking with Taliban

President Barack Obama was right to temper the expectations from these talks. Describing them as “an important first step” towards Afghan reconciliation,Obama said,“We anticipate that there will be a lot of bumps on the road”. After all,America’s efforts to negotiate with the Taliban — in 1998,after the al-Qaeda bombings of the American embassies in East Africa,and in the immediate wake of the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington — came to naught. Structuring the current round of talks has also been a tedious and difficult process. Reinforcing the many doubts about the incipient dialogue is the Taliban’s refusal to renounce violence during the talks. Further,instead of acknowledging the legitimacy of the Afghan constitution,the Taliban has underlined its commitment to establish an Islamic political system in the country.

Despite the Taliban’s reluctance to abandon violent extremism,Washington has chosen to press ahead with the dialogue. America is taking comfort from the Taliban’s vague promise to dissociate itself from the al-Qaeda. While it has refused to recognise the current elected government led by President Hamid Karzai,the Taliban has hinted at its readiness to engage all Afghans. The US hopes that its initial engagement with the Taliban will lead to direct talks between Kabul and the Taliban. But,uncomfortable with the contradictions in the dialogue process,Karzai had withdrawn support hours after the talks were announced. On its part,Delhi has good reason to stay sceptical about the prospects for political reconciliation in Afghanistan. Yet,the time has also come for India to step up its engagement with all Afghan formations and intensify its support to Kabul. India must continue to caution the US against too many compromises with the Taliban and its chief patron,the Pakistan army,in its eagerness to withdraw from Afghanistan.