Listening in

When the furore over telephone conversations of politicians being tapped hit Parliament,Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram clarified that the government had not authorised the tapping of any politicians telephone. But as this newspaper reported on April 27,the problem was not targetted tapping of a specific telephone number,something that needs explicit authorisation. The controversy centred on passive,or off-the-air,interception using a listening device to access randomly,chatter in a given area. The allegation was that in the course of technical intelligence operations,parts of conversations of some politicians had been tracked. While the Indian Telegraph Act regulates target-centric tapping of a specific phone number and the courts have order stringent protocols to be followed,the law is silent on passive intercepts. It is in this context that the home ministrys proposal to bring passive intercepts under a regulatory regime must be welcomed.

Apart from regulatation under the Telegraph Act,the Supreme Court has set up elaborate safeguards for target-centric phone-tapping,entrusting a high-level committee to review the tapping on a monthly basis. Union Home Secretary G.K. Pillai says the government is proposing legislation to regulate the purchase,deployment and monitoring of passive interception technology. It also wants all passive interceptors in India to be identified. With regard to intelligence agencies,it would mean limiting the possibility of politically motivated tapping. With regard to private players who should not have use of such technology in the first place the home secretary suggests that a deadline be given to surrender the devices,after which penal action will be taken. Since the listening devices,estimated to cost Rs 1-10 crore,are not prohibitively expensive,aggressive monitoring is crucial.

The tension between civil liberties and signal intercepts is an inevitable one in a liberal democracy,and privacy safeguards must coexist with sophisticated intelligence-gathering. For instance,our ability to listen in on telephone chatter between the 26/11 killers and their Pakistani handlers was key to proving the Pakistan connection. Surveillance,including through telephone intercepts,is a security need. But there must be rigorous oversight of surveillance,the data carefully managed,and misuse penalised. It is hoped that the proposed legislation navigates these competing aims.