Far from being an ideology,non-alignment was a strategy devised by Nehru’

In November 1962,I shared a room with my senior colleague S Soundararajan,from whom I had taken over as deputy secretary (JIO) [in the Ministry of Defence. It was 9 pm on November 19,and a visibly shaken Soundararajan came and told me of this telegram which he had seen with [Vincent Coelho [then joint secretary (Americas) in the External Affairs Ministry. I did not see the text of the telegram and what Soundararajan told me at that time confirms Inder Malhotra’s (‘Letters from the darkest hour’,IE,November 17) rather than Sudhir Ghosh’s account. Nehru did not ask for an aircraft carrier. But the Americans did have an aircraft carrier (USS Enterprise) in the Indian Ocean and it did move into the Bay of Bengal.

This particular incident and what happened subsequently have very valuable lessons to non-alignment cultists on Nehru’s use of the concept as a strategy to safeguard India’s security and not as a third-worldist ideology.

What should be of interest here is the triangle of India,the US and the USSR. From 1963 to 1965,India was concluding major defence agreements with both the US and the USSR,with neither party objecting to our dealings with the other. Z A Bhutto used to say that India was bi-aligned and not non-aligned. The crux of non-alignment is that this country does not get involved in some other power’s antagonism and it does not mean that we sacrifice our national security by keeping away from other powers when our national security interest necessitates our dealing with them.

No second thoughts
On no-first-use policy
8 September 2009

The Chief of the Army Staff,General Deepak Kapoor,is reported to have suggested that the country may have to revisit its “No First Use” (NFU) policy in the light of reports from some credible US sources that Pakistan may have an arsenal of 90 nuclear weapons and may be building up further stocks.

When NFU was formulated (I was the convener of the National Security Board that drafted it) there were no assumptions on the size of the Pakistani arsenal. The doctrine stands by itself irrespective of the size of the potential enemy’s arsenal. There is a second component of the nuclear doctrine: the credible minimum deterrent. It is that component that may call for some adjustments if the potential enemy’s arsenal were to increase. Even that is not a necessity from the point of view of deterrence,but a question of influencing the perception of the adversary. The crux of deterrence is the survivability of the retaliatory force and the aggressor’s calculation as to whether the casualties and damage likely to be inflicted by the survived retaliatory force on his population and cities can be justified by the strategic gain the unleashing of the nuclear attack will secure for the aggressor. Very rarely,if at all,can the answer to that question be in the affirmative. In such circumstances deterrence will prevail.

The more robust the deterrence,the stronger the justification for the NFU strategy. If today an increase in the Pakistani nuclear stockpile and the development of Babar cruise missile cause concern about a decapitating first strike,then the logical remedy is not to abandon our NFU but to provide for credible,visible succession for both political and military command,and to streamline the chain of command.

Giving up NFU will only increase nuclear tension without solving the problem of the risk of a possible decapitating strike by the potential enemy. There must be a better understanding of the national no-first-use policy among our armed forces and other decision- and policy-makers,as well as a deeper grasp of the concept of deterrence.

Four men & a tough promise
On the road to nuclear disarmament
5 March 2008

The initiative taken by the American bipartisan group of former Republican secretaries of state,George Schultz and Henry Kissinger,and Democratic statesmen,former Defence Secretary William Perry and former Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn,has revived interest in nuclear disarmament in the West.

It is unrealistic to talk of a nuclear weapons-free world unless it is preceded by delegitimisation of the weapon. No weapon deemed legitimate will ever get eliminated. The four American statesmen talk of the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons and describe it as the top of a very tall mountain and of the need to chart a course to higher ground where the mountain top becomes visible. Logically,that higher ground is delegitimisation of the weapon and an agreement on no first use. Unfortunately,NATO rejected the pleas of Germany and Canada and insisted on the right to first use of nuclear weapons — its legitimacy — in its declaration [in 1999. The four US statesmen have not dealt with this issue.

The Indian initiative in Geneva on the other hand emphasises this aspect in its seven-step approach to a world without nuclear weapons. It is clear that Indian thinking on moving towards a world without nuclear weapons,going back to Rajiv Gandhi,is broadly parallel to the proposals of the US statesmen except in the crucial respect of delegitimisation as an initial step.

The four statesmen are very influential in the Western world and their programme has been endorsed by the Democratic presidential candidates and their advocacy chimes in many ways with long-held Indian positions. India should now take the initiative to synergise its efforts at the Conference on Disarmament with their campaign and in the process fill the gaps in their approach.

Coming up: floor test
On who stood where vis-a-vis the 123 agreement
3 November 2007

The suggested parliamentary debate on the 123 agreement will be among the most important discussions held in Parliament in independent India. It will be a test for all political parties in terms of their approach to India’s national interest.

The 123 agreement is being opposed by the Left parties and they are attempting to mobilise other parties of the UNPA to oppose it in the forthcoming session of Parliament. Unlike the two major national parties — the Congress and BJP — the Left has always been opposed to India going nuclear. Now on the issue of operationalising the 123 agreement they threaten to combine with the NDA and withdraw support to the UPA.

What is in the NDA’s interest? It has some shared interests with the UPA — such as nuclear arsenal,enhancement of relationship with US,economic reforms and engagement with the international community — but none with the Left Front. Eminent analysts like the former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra are of the view that if the NDA can obtain assurances on certain issues in the 123 agreement it should be allowed to go through.

There is a legitimate complaint that there is not adequate communication between the major parties on the nuclear issue. Unfortunately the origin of this was the Shakti tests when no credit was given to the Congress prime ministers for building the nuclear arsenal. In spite of that,the UPA is continuing the policies of the NDA in national interest. It may be recalled that when a UPA minister called the Shakti tests a mistake,that was repudiated by the PM. In the same spirit,the NDA should sustain the policy it initiated with its NSSP declaration in 2003 and support the 123 agreement which is a further evolution of the NSSP.

Non-alignment
On popular notions about the concept
6 July 2007

Though the ideologues of non-alignment in India and the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice may not realise it,both entertain the same misconceptions about non-alignment. Both appear to think that it is an ideology with a well-defined value system. Those who are persuaded that non-alignment is an ideology subscribed to mostly by non-democratic states,as Rice appears to be,assert that it has become irrelevant,and question why a democracy like India still continues to subscribe to it. On the other side,the ideologues of non-alignment point out that the non-aligned are united in their espousal of an equitable trade regime,reform of the UN and a just and fair world order.

But non-alignment is far from being an ideology. In reality non-alignment was a strategy devised by Jawaharlal Nehru after Churchill’s Fulton speech when he was anticipating the division of the international system into a bi-polar world. He talked of not joining any power bloc aligned against each other. With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a polycentric balance of power among six major nations – US,European Union,Russia,China,Japan and India – there is no more bloc politics. In the light of the above reality there was no need for Rice to raise the question about the relevance of non-alignment in Indian foreign policy. The cooperation she seeks with democracies like India,Brazil,Indonesia and South Africa can be obtained without non-alignment coming in the way…