Thirteen years of pain

The 13-year-old sanctions against Iraq, the most aggressive ever imposed by the UN, which are believed to have led to the death of millions of children, have finally been lifted by UN Security Council resolution. This also provides the authority for the US and UK to rule Iraq for an undefined time into the future. As Secretary General Kofi Annan said, this is a compromise. And any judgement on a compromise must rest, not on the issue of a compromise per se, but on the question whether it is a good one or not. The fact that the resolution has brought the major powers together is an indication of it being a good compromise. The UN, putting aside recent polarisation, will have an important—but not a lead— role with a “special representative” with “independent responsibility” who works with others “to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognised representative government of Iraq.”

In lifting the sanctions the UN Security Council also waived the stipulated condition of UN inspectors’ certifying Iraq’s disarmament as a pre-requisite for their removal. This only reflects the reality where the Anglo-American forces and their specialised task forces have found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction after more than two months. Since this was a major reason for launching the war, the UN resolution implicitly accepts that the war was unnecessary, at least on this count. The chaos in Iraq is tragic and will need to be ended at the earliest. This has been severely aggravated by the inability and/or unwillingness of the Anglo-American forces to ensure peace and order from the very beginning. But continued occupation and rule of Iraq by US-UK is a reality, although the two countries should move quickly toward a multinational/UN management of the functional administration and restoration of normalcy in the country.

The most crucial need of the hour is the stabilisation of Iraq and the provision of humanitarian assistance to its people. There is no way that Washington and London can manage this task on their own. Whether formally or otherwise, other countries would have to be involved. In fact, there is a strong argument in favour of the view that it is the responsibility of all those countries that have traditionally been very close to Iraq to now make their contribution in substantive ways. Objectively, therefore, New Delhi should approach this issue from basic principles and not shy away from contributing to a stabilisation force merely on grounds of a principled difference on the waging of war itself. And nor do we need to do what is needed merely to please someone or for a reward of material gains. Our responsibility to the Iraqis transcends such considerations.