The wisdom in ceasing fire

To begin with, a ceasefire during counter-insurgency operations is not unusual but a well-trodden path the world over. We ourselves have resorted to it regularly in the Northeast. Even at the height of operations in Sri Lanka a unilateral declaration of ceasefire was resorted to by the IPKF to enable those members of society who had been alienated by force of circumstances to be weaned away to rejoin the mainstream. It was successful and resulted in large-scale participation by the Sri Lankan Tamils in the 1988 elections.

One major argument against the ceasefire is that it would give the militants a breather, an opportunity to regroup. This would be very relevant if the operations against the militants were at a stage where we were about to finish them off and what remained was just the last push. However, this is not the case and we appear embarked on an open-ended military commitment. The other objection to the ceasefire is that it could adversely affect the morale of soldiers involved in the operations in Jamp;K. This concern is well taken. What needs to be analysed is whether for the soldiers who have been fighting there continuously for 12 years the prospect of continuing fighting with no end in sight is better for their morale or an initiative by the government which has the possibilities of leading to a political resolution.

While opposition to the declaration of ceasefire by India from across the border by extremist elements there is understandable and expected, what is surprising is the domestic criticism. Indeed, this is only the beginning of the ceasefire and it may be reasonably expected that vested interests on both sides of the border who are not interested in a political resolution to the Kashmir problem will try to up the ante by indulging in high-profile acts of terrorism. We must not lose our cool and will have to be prepared to bear it. Domestically we need to take cognisance of the fact that more than 70 per cent of the militants are Kashmiris and the government is not embarked on waging war against its own citizens but in trying to bring them around to joining the mainstream and the democratic process.

In a shrinking world where sometimes even a pragmatic domestic law becomes an international human rights issue, it would be ostrich like to remain under the illusion that an eye-ball to eye-ball8217; confrontation between two nuclear weapon states will be left alone by the international community as a domestic issue. Counter-insurgency operations in Jamp;K are no longer a purely domestic matter and world opinion and perception of our conduct is important. We should not be seen as rigid and uncompromising in our approach because ultimately there are only two solutions to the problem 8212; a political resolution or a military solution 8212; and the pros and cons of the two need no elaboration. No political resolution or interaction can take place when both parties are engaged in full-fledged fighting and we must provide an opportunity for any possible political breakthrough by giving peace a chance. The international and domestic political payoff from our mature approach and perseverance can far outweigh the cost.

The writer is a former army commander and IPKF chief. He is currently chairman of the International Council for Conflic.