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Journalism of Courage
As the frontier summer intensifies, the breeze in the serene mountain village of Hisari near Garhi Habibullah is pleasantly cool. South of the village, spread on the pine-covered slopes of a hill overlooking Kunhar River, is the guardroom of a camp run by Hizbul Mujahideen HM. A jeep track leads past the barrier into the residential quarters, a series of barracks each with its small kitchen. A separate building houses the camp8217;s office and a small library. There is a mosque, which serves as the main lecture hall and a main kitchen that cooks three meals a day for the 250 residents.
But unlike the usual verve and operational precision that mark life at such camps, the atmosphere in the Hisari camp appears to be one of lethargy and disorientation. Some distance from the residential compound, on a level ground that is fenced off, a dozen men wearing T-shirts and track pants are playing football.
Apparently, more than a thousand trained militants from the Indian Kashmir are currently stranded in three HM camps in the Hazara region of the Frontier province alone. Of these, the Hisari and Batrasi camps are located in the Mansehra district while a third camp is located in Boi in district Abbottabad. Sources say that thousands of other militants find themselves similarly confined to camps run by half a dozen smaller Kashmiri groups or predominantly Pakistani outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba LT, Jaish-e-Mohammad JM, Harkatul Mujahideen HuM and al-Badr Mujahideen ABM in the Frontier and Pakistan-administered Kashmir regions.
This situation is the result of what some term Islamabad8217;s policy of 8220;demobilising militants8221; to create conditions for a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir issue. This policy marks a radical departure from Islamabad8217;s earlier support to Kashmiri militants. 8220;The top brass of the Inter-Services Intelligence ISI conveyed to the Kashmiri militant leaders in January that they should not even think of crossing the Line of Control LoC, armed or not,8221; says one militant leader based in Islamabad.
Investigations by the Herald reveal that Pakistan has moved on three fronts to implement this policy. First, border patrolling by the Pakistani security agencies has been intensified in those areas along the LoC where the infiltration since the early 1990s has been on the higher side. These areas fall in the Neelum Valley, Lipa, Chakothi and Bagh sectors.
Secondly, the ISI functionaries who had earlier worked with the militants have been asked to run routine checks to ascertain the whereabouts of the Kashmiri guides and porters who helped militants infiltrate in the past. The residents of villages along the LoC have also been instructed to report any militant activity that takes place in their areas. ISI functionaries have also been appointed to the military border posts to monitor movement across the LoC.
8220;It is no longer possible for militant organisations to launch groups for infiltration like they used to, unless they go through difficult gorges and ravines that cannot be fenced by the Indians or guarded by the Pakistanis,8221; says a veteran Kashmiri fighter currently stranded in Islamabad.
But the decision that has actually sent the alarm bells ringing for the jihadi circles pertains to stopping official funds8212;the so-called 8220;operation money8221; reportedly provided to different organisations monthly. Inquiries made by the Herald reveal that although major jihadi organisations have various sources of funds, official funding traditionally made up the bulk of their financial inflows.
Knowledgeable sources confide that until recently, small organisations such as the Tehrik-e-Mujahideen, al-Fatah, al-Jihad, al-Barq, Tehrik-e-Jihad, Islamic Front and Harkat Jihad Islami were receiving between 4,00,000 to 7,00, 000 Pakistani rupees a month whereas larger organisations such as HM, LT, JM, ABM and others received more money, ranging between two to three million Pakistani rupees. This was in addition to funds that paid for the logistics, communication equipment, weapons, explosives, food and trekking kits for the thousands of militants, guides and porters who infiltrated into India every year.
According to insiders, the official funds were largely used by the recipient outfits to meet the expenses of offices, vehicles, camps and manpower. The cessation of these funds has jeopardised the entire infrastructure. The smaller organisations are the worst hit by this decision. 8220;Even major groups such as the HM, LT and JM cannot sustain themselves without government support beyond a year,8221; says a Muzaffarabad-based observer.
As regards operations inside Indian Kashmir, militant commanders say they have arms and ammunition in the region that may last for two years. 8220;If our pipelines remain dry, the freedom movement in Kashmir will grind to a halt by 2008,8221; adds one Muzaffarabad-based commander.
The militant outfits pay anywhere from 1,000 to 3,000 Pakistani rupees per month as pocket money to their respective militant cadres in different categories. 8220;Any reduction in this amount is likely to affect the established routines and cause a decline in the morale of fighters,8221; the observer says.
8220;While militants of the Pakistani groups can just walk out of the camp, go home and start a new life, Kashmiris from India enjoy no such luxuries,8221; says a Kashmiri fighter hibernating in Islamabad. Given that they are 8220;outsiders8221; in Pakistan, these militants are subject to a different camp discipline.
8220;Until two years ago, they were not allowed to marry Pakistani women or mix with the local population. Even now, they are not allowed to leave their camps or attempt to go back home either by crossing the LoC or via Nepal,8221; he adds.
Smaller outfits such as the Tehrik-e-Mujahideen, Al Omar Mujahideen, Jamiat-e-Mujahideen and others have stopped their activists pocket money. The payments to activists of larger organisations have also been reduced drastically, forcing many of them to make a desperate run for their homes. Many activists have either been caught by the Pakistani border guards or shot down by the Indians. A majority of those who made it across the LoC have surrendered to the Indian authorities in a bid to start a normal life in their hometowns.
In Pakistan, the resources of the militant organisations are shrinking visibly. A medium-sized ABM, for example, is finding it hard to sustain its present level of operations despite having independent sources of funds. The organisation manages to sell a large quantity of compact discs and other propaganda material during its frequent village-level public meetings in northern Pakistan. Besides, it has access to substantial funds raised through mosque donations. But recently it had to ground three of the five all-terrain vehicles it had been using and further spending cuts are likely. 8220;If this situation persists, we would be left with no option but to close down most of our district level liaison offices,8221; says an ABM source in Timergara district.
Larger Pakistani organisations such at LT and JM have been able to diversify themselves in the aftermath of last year8217;s earthquake and have registered as relief organisations under different names, but the predominantly Kashmiri HM is caught between a rock and a hard place. 8220;Since 9/11 we have known that this would happen.We even made some preparations, but the axe has fallen a bit too soon,8221; says a senior HM activist.
In early 2004, under a rehabilitation programme for militants, HM chief Syed Salahuddin promised a 40,000 Pakistani rupee aid package and a stipend of 9,000 Pakistani rupees per month for militants over 30 years of age who would marry and settle down in Pakistan. While some militants availed the opportunity, most of them waited to join the action in Kashmir.
8220;The announcement of the policy came at a time when the HM camps in Hazara were closed and we were moved to the premises of a cement factory in Taxila. We thought it was the end of jihad,8221; says an insider of the Hisari camp. But as it became evident later, the camps were closed temporarily under international pressure.
8220;A year later, the facilities were restored and most of us came back instead of getting married,8221; he says. Another year down the line, however, these militants find themselves sitting idle under the watchful eyes of not only their seniors but also the intelligence operatives posted to their guardrooms.
Looming prospects of a financial crunch and the rising unrest among the militant cadres forced the jihadi leaders to start protest camp on the premises of the Kashmiri Refugees Management Cell, near Rawalpindi, in early March. Those who staged a sit-in at the camp included Salahuddin, ABM Chief Bakht Zamin, Tehrik-e-Mujahideen chief Shaikh Jamilur Rahman and representatives of about 18 Pakistani and Kashmiri militant organisations that form a loose alliance under the banner of the Muttahida Jihad Council MJC. The protest threatened to embarrass Islamabad that officially does not allow Kashmiri organisations to operate on Pakistani soil. Following some nervous activity on the part of the intelligence apparatus, the MJC wrapped up its protest camp on March 8.
Since then, the militant leaders appear to have bowed down to government pressure and do not admit staging a protest in Rawalpindi, let alone explain what the aim of the protest was. 8220;The sit-in was held at Muzaffarabad and was meant to lodge a protest against Islamabad8217;s unilateral concessions to India8230;8221; Salahuddin tells the Herald.
But hawks are adamant the policy of demobilising Kashmiri militants is not expected to work in the long run because, as former ISI chief Lt-Gen retd Hamid Gul contends, Pakistan8217;s internal compulsions are in conflict with the external pressures. 8220;General Musharraf8217;s decisions do not necessarily reflect the army8217;s vision,8221; he says. Salahuddin also believes that Pakistan will have to rethink its Kashmir policy because 8220;the Indians are not going to budge an inch from their position on the issue8221;.
But some think that Pakistan has 8216;ditched8217; the Kashmiris for the second time in 16 years. According to one HM insider, it is now on the record that General Zia-ul-Haq8217;s government orgaised the pro-independence Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front to start the insurgency in Kashmir in 1988: 8220;When the insurgency turned out to be a success, the Pakistanis decided to throw the JKLF to the wolves and started backing pro-Pakistan groups. They may now do the same to the latter.8221; HERALD
