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That invisible agent

In browsing through the Internet, one came across an article titled 8216;8216;Err War: The Army buries its mistakes8217;8217; by Fred Ka...

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In browsing through the Internet, one came across an article titled 8216;8216;Err War: The Army buries its mistakes8217;8217; by Fred Kaplan. The article speaks of 8216;8216;an official, unclassified, and highly critical report on the US army8217;s inefficient to shoddy intelligence practices in Iraq and Afghanistan8217;8217; written by the Center for Army Lessons Learnt, and more importantly the removal of this report from the Center8217;s website, after The Washington Post published a story summarising the contents. It is a tale of a bad case made worse by attempts at obfuscation.

Intelligence is the sine qua non for efficient, cost effective, defensive and offensive action. It is not the intention to tabulate or berate our intelligence failures of the past as well as attempts at cover-ups at times. Hopefully lessons have been learnt but it is worth stating that intelligence about the adversary need not be confined to military aspects; diplomatic, political, social, economic, technological, industrial intelligence et al all have a part to play in national policies. The need for intelligence information is even greater today given the faster pace required in decision making, particularly military decision making. The adage 8216;8216;information is power8217;8217; has taken on a more urgent dimension.

Many aids to intelligence gathering are available, but all aids put together cannot obviate the need for HUMINT human intelligence. HUMINT is a specialised activity requiring training, expertise, analytical ability and, above all, secrecy. HUMINT, of necessity, must be carried out behind the scenes, quietly. It is painstaking, laborious work that demands patience on the part of both the agent and his superior, adequate resources, plus heavy doses of mutual trust.

In the Kaplan article referred to, the report stated that the 69 HUMINT teams in Iraq have produced inadequate work because of lack of guidance and focus from superiors; inadequate expertise and analytical skills; information overflow; no internal analysis capability; tasking agents for combat tasks thereby compromising their cover; and, more seriously, giving intelligence reduced priority. These are the ills faced by the intelligence community time and again, in all parts of the world including India. One problem is that in the real world, there is no high visibility attached to serious intelligence work and spectacular results are few and far between. Even then, the good work done often cannot be publicised and rewards, if any, must be away from the spotlight. Shooting down an aircraft, overrunning an enemy position and planting the national flag are military victories that automatically attract media attention, appropriate rewards, and life long nostalgic recounting of events. Such activities draw favourable attention to the commanders and leaders as well. Little wonder, therefore, that the silent, unseen, away from the limelight, hard slog of the intelligence agent is given short shrift.

The career of the agent is also a factor to contend with. There are few who would accept stagnation in their career even if they come to like the ever present danger and high adrenalin producing nature of the job. There should be greater incentives for the job that could involve, inter alia, personal appreciation, and ensuring that the tools of the trade are the best we can afford. Above all, the agents, whilst recognising the importance of continuity and limited career options, must feel cared for and wanted.

There is also a flip side to what has been stated so far. Given the secretive nature of intelligence activity, and the recognised need for non-attributability of sources, there is a danger that evidence and conclusions can be manufactured. Good intelligence aids good decision making, and 8216;8216;bad8217;8217; intelligence could lead to sub-optimal decisions and maybe embarrassments and disasters. A balanced approach is essential. For instance, wrong intelligence, or wrong deductions from indefinite intelligence, purportedly convinced the US and Britain that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and, even worse, that the Iraqis would welcome them as liberators. Hence, the Second Gulf War occurred. The effect of relying on such intelligence is there for all to see.

Again, inadequate importance given to intelligence is making the task of the allied forces in Iraq today that much more difficult. The stabilisation of the country is still far away. In short, intelligence capability has to be built up, maintained and trusted. Even then mistakes could occur but they will be fewer and their import less significant.

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An associated aspect that possibly deserves greater attention than what it is receiving is security, particularly security in the use of information technology. We are already highly dependent on computers and allied technologies including the use of Internet and similar facilities. The efficiency imparted is so great that ever increasing dependence is inevitable. It is difficult to think of means or systems that will provide adequate redundancy and safety. Yet, just as good hardware and improved software continue to produce more efficient systems, a branch of software is also growing that is posing a major challenge. Hacking and introduction of disinformation into networks are near outdated. The worms and viruses that can now be injected into systems are far more sophisticated and could defy most anti-virus products. Recent virus attacks like SoBig and MsBlast have re-alerted the world on the possible dangers and great potential for 8216;8216;mischief8217;8217;. Much energy is being spent on measures to safeguard computers and computer networks lest they become unserviceable or, even worse, unreliable when most needed. This is not a one-time exercise. We, in India, should also have a dedicated team or teams that work full time on producing effective defensive systems. As a corollary, such activity would also help in producing offensive systems as and when they are required, and when the legality of such action is accepted.

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