Tailed in Islamabad

“Great people, paranoid state”, the first chapter, could have served as an alternate title for the book. Being one of two Indian reporters allowed to be based in Pakistan (Benazir Bhutto reduced the number from four to two, and India reciprocated), he had an “escorted” existence and the intelligence agencies ensured that he and his family were “never alone”. There are many humorous anecdotes, like a motorbike-borne sleuth who had to tail Baruah — on his bicycle — at a snail’s pace. His restricted visa allowed him limited access to the country and Baruah categorically laments not being able to report Kargil and Kandahar. Juxtaposed against these grudges is his affection for the friends he made there, substantiated by his mention of those friends kept anonymous for the sake of their security. “Assignment Islamabad” was a “daunting task”.

The book is dotted with instances of a point cardinal to the way strings are pulled in Pakistan: “In order to have the right type of elite connections, at least one member of the family had links with the military. This was essential, like an insurance policy.” One senses Baruah’s observation of the army being a self-proclaimed custodian of the country when he says, “the army intervenes when it feels the country needs it”. His friends shocked him when they said coups were a simple affair in their country; a jeep from the 111 Brigade drove from Rawalpindi to Islamabad, and Pakistan passed from civilian to military hands! The Fauj, he says, is a permanent pillar of the establishment, with its ancillaries like the Fauji Foundation being the largest private-sector employer of the country. Baruah says then prime minister Nawaz Sharif helped make the army all-pervasive and his government weak. It was called in to dispense justice, conduct the census and build roads.

Dateline Islamabad carries ample accounts of then army chief Pervez Musharraf’s disdain for Sharif. He writes at length about how Musharraf kept Sharif in the dark regarding the Kargil operation. The Lahore Summit, which happened just before Kargil, according to Baruah, failed because of India’s failure to reach out to both the civilian and military leadership of Pakistan.

Surprises never eluded Baruah during his stay in Pakistan. His narration of Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Muhammad Saeed moving about freely in Islamabad with a government number plate on his car is chilling.

The book ends on an interesting note: America is said to be a “referee” between India and Pakistan. Baruah draws three major inferences at the end. The litmus test for Musharraf’s sincerity towards India will be the treatment meted out to Pakistan-based militant groups. Secondly, Kashmir remains pivotal to Pakistan’s agenda. Finally, the fundamental forces in both the countries continue to be the perpetual threat to their relations.