Peace is a realist’s brew

A major assumption of modern realist theory is that states are unitary actors that interact only along their boundaries. This idea of billia...

A major assumption of modern realist theory is that states are unitary actors that interact only along their boundaries. This idea of billiard-ball type contact between states, and its derivative, that inter-state interaction can be insulated from intra-state happenings, cannot apply to India and Pakistan. The conflict between them billows deep into the domestic sphere in both countries.

Undoubtedly, the core idea of realist theory — that states, having to operate in an anarchical environment, are compelled to define their interests as power and pursue them — is applicable to India and Pakistan. But power, for it to be evaluated on a realistic basis, must be related to circumstances. Tussles between asymmetrically resourced power structures such as India and Pakistan can go on for a long time because the rivals have different views on what appropriate power is in their situation.

The view through a realist lens must focus on the realities as they exist today and as they are likely to get shaped tomorrow. Ideological and legal arguments are no longer of much consequence in Kashmir. Nor is the over-chronicled ‘burden of history’. What matters today are the applicable politico-military power of India and Pakistan and the quality of their ‘no-agreement alternatives’.

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The structure of the India-Pakistan conflict is easier to deal with than how it is generally perceived. India’s composite nationalism and Pakistan’s Islamic nationalism no longer threaten one another. In contrast to the Israeli-Palestinian situation, neither India nor Pakistan has a need — in security, resource and internal coherence terms — for the part of J&K that is with the other country. Kashmiri Indians are happy to stay with India if their autonomy aspirations are met. And most other Indians have no objection to increasing the state’s autonomy provided Pakistan does not exploit it.

There is a growing understanding in Pakistan that the LoC will have to become a permanent border. But it is not possible for a Pakistani government to concede this without political cover. Substantial restoration of J&K’s autonomy can provide some of it. India’s fundamental problem with autonomy is the fear of its impact on the security of the state. This fear is best allayed through parallel autonomy for the part that is with Pakistan.

While the basic agreement on J&K has to be between India and Pakistan, the aspirations of the people of the state must also be met. This is both a matter of justice and a structural need. The structure of the conflict, as it has evolved, makes it impossible to arrive at sustainable peace without the support of key groups in J&K, especially the Valley Muslims and the Jammu Hindus. India needs to recognise that the political system in J&K is broken and calls for overhaul.

The Pakistan Army has been the biggest hurdle to India and Pakistan improving relations. The army now knows its position is deteriorating, domestically and internationally, and that Kashmir is a major cause. On its part, India must recognise that the army is the only power structure in Pakistan that can make peace in the foreseeable future. Genuine democracy in Pakistan is more likely to follow peace than the other way round.

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Islamists are a fact of life in Pakistan. They are the country’s primary means of exerting pressure in Kashmir. The army, therefore, will not de-fang them despite the serious threat they now pose to the Pakistani state, and indeed to the army’s own long term interests. This position will only change when they are no longer seen as vital for ‘national security’. The India-Pakistan conflict is also the key factor that sustains support for Islamic radicals in Pakistani Punjab, just as the Afghan conflict props them up in Pashtun areas.

A Pakistani perception that India is anxious to get rid of a Kashmir millstone is as misplaced as an Indian belief that Pakistan can be compelled to eliminate its jihadis through international pressure. It is unrealistic for India to think that an LoC solution can be achieved without a fair degree of autonomy accorded in Kashmir. So it is for Pakistan to consider that autonomy can be confined to the Indian side. More fundamentally, India is not prepared for a peace that puts the security of J&K in jeopardy. Nor is Pakistan for one that can destabilise it internally. Without the two governments preparing themselves, and their publics, for painful shifts away from long held positions — Pakistan’s on the LoC and India’s on autonomy — a realistic peace cannot be negotiated.

The writer’s book, ‘Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through a Realist Lens’, is just out