
8226;What is the Indian context?
Mahmud8217;s raid on Somnath has been considered a pivotal event that polarised the Hindus and Muslims of India against one another. Yet, little more than two centuries after the raid, the authorities of the re-built Somnath temple gave permission to found a mosque on temple lands. Hindu temple authorities actively encouraged Muslims to settle and trade near the temple, benefiting from the commercial taxes that Middle Eastern trade would bring8230;In fact, throughout India, towns that traded to the Middle East in medieval times continue to show evidence of increased tolerance between Hindus and Muslims.
8226;What does the model do?
The model focuses on towns with two types of ethnic groups: 8220;local8221; and 8220;non-local8221;, where non-local ethnic groups direg;er from local groups by having better outside options. In the case of Muslim traders in medieval India, the 8220;non-local8221; group enjoyed social and cultural ties to Arabia and the Middle East not enjoyed by the local population.
8226;What does the model suggest about co-existence?
The paper focuses on strategies that support 8220;peaceful co-existence8221; over time: no one prefers to leave or to engage in violence. The model reveals that three conditions need to be satisfied. First, there needs to be 8220;complementarity8221; between ethnic groups, i.e. there are gains from exchange between them. Second, there needs to a high cost for either group to steal or duplicate the source of the others8217; 8220;complementarity8221;. Third, there must be an effective mechanism to redistribute the gains from trade between groups.
8226;How did 8220;complementarity8221; and redistribution work in medieval Indian ports?
First, Muslim traders provided complements to Hindu producers and financiers: access to the trade networks and markets of the Middle East. Second, because Muslim trade networks were coordinated along pilgrimage routes that were specific to Islam such as the Haj they were largely closed to Hindus and could not be stolen or replicated. Third, Muslim traders benefited from an inherent redistribution mechanism: Middle Eastern trade was relatively easy for any Muslim to access. With pilgrimage routes coordinating where and when trade would occur, Muslims did not require personal ties or information to enter into trade. This ease of entry meant that competing groups of both immigrants and converts became traders whenever Indian prices were high, increasing competition within the non-local minority and improving prices for locals. This natural mechanism of redistribution thus reduced incentives to riot to seize wealth.
In contrast to physical and human capital, most ethnic trading networks are both difficult to steal being intangible and extremely costly to replicate.
These 8220;institutions8221; that persisted even after Muslims lost their advantages in trade following increased European involvement, and facilitated a continued legacy of religious tolerance.
8226;When does violence occur?
The model suggests that ethnic violence is likely to occur when ethnic groups compete, when the source of inter-ethnic complementarity is easy for one group to expropriate or replicate, or when no mechanism exists to redistribute the gains from trade.
8226;How can it be replicated in modern India?
Educational systems that allow minority individuals the choice of leveraging the advantages of their group to engage in broader exchange, rather than promoting homogenisation of a town8217;s human capital, may result in less competition and greater inter-group complementarity. An explicit and well-publicised system of transfers established by members of a minority community to the local population, in the form of earmarked taxes or endowed public goods, may be effective in improving between-group relations8230;Organisations that match members of different communities with complementary skills in the creation of such jointly-held business ventures may combine the benefits of complementarity with transfer provision.
Extracted from 8220;Maintaining peace across ethnic lines8221;, available at ssrn.com