Opting for softer targets

When questioned about the changing trends in the anti-militancy operations, top-ranking police officials highlight the following points. One, that there was now a flow of specific information coming from the locals about the whereabouts and hideouts of the militants. Instead of unwieldy search-and-cordon operations, this has led to encounters in which top-ranking militants like Abdul Rehman, Iliaz Gazi, Gulam Rasool Wani and Firdos Kirmani have been killed. Since October last year, 610 militants have been killed and 1,292 arrested.

Secondly, for the first time in seven years, instead of the jawans of the CRPF and BSF, it is the Jammu and Kashmir policemen who are spearheading the anti-militancy operations in the Valley and also manning the civilian posts in towns and villages. In Srinagar, a majority of the bunkers manned by the BSF jawans have been removed and it is the khaki uniforms of the local policemen which dominate the scene.

The third shift will, perhaps, be the most crucial in a period when the security forces expect to consolidate their gains. Director General of Police Gurbachan Jagat admitted that militants were now forgoing their confrontationist tactics and were attacking softer targets with the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and land mines.

“The greater use of IEDs shows that the militants are on the defensive while security forces are on the offensive,” the police chief explained. “And while the use of these devices does put some psychological pressure on the forces, we have offset that with the greater deployment of Road Opening Parties (ROPs) and anti-sabotage teams.”

Thus, the sight of the ubiquitous ROPs, which are actually anti-sabotage teams manned by army jawans, equipped with mine-detectors and mine sweepers have become a common sight in the picturesque valley. The ROPs are used specifically where some VIP movement is expected as well as on routes frequented by senior officers, bureaucrats and politicians. In Jammu and Srinagar, VIP installations, including the Secretariat, High Court and residences of VVIPs are combed by anti-sabotage teams twice a day.

Senior officials claim that while they had information about explosives, detonators and timing devices being smuggled from Pakistan as early as 1983, there was definitely a greater inflow now. As one officer put it: “With IEDs and mines, you cannot engage an enemy. The greater dependency on them is part of the disengaging tactics being adopted by militants in Kashmir. The militants are not gaining any ground by using them. They are just creating some scare.”

Figures of the recoveries are alarming and there is mounting evidence that the militant groups are also using the Bangladesh and Nepal route to smuggle them into the valley. Since 1990, 10,525 kg of explosives, 1,913 IEDs, 4,090 mines and 26,209 detonators have been recovered. Of this, recoveries have been most sizeable in the nine months of political rule: 1,700 kg of explosives, 652 IEDs, 298 mines and 3,923 detonators.

According to Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, the use of IEDs and mines had transformed the anti-militancy operations into a battle of wits since the security forces were oblivious about where and how the explosives have been planted. In December last year, a mine exploded near the mausoleum of his father, Sheikh Abdullah in the Hazratbal area, minutes before he was to visit it despite the fact that the entire area had been combed and sanitised by ROPs. Though no lives were lost, the incident exposed the lacunae in the anti-sabotage checks being conducted by the forces.

The Chief Minister said he looked upon the reliance of such devices as evidence of the growing cowardice of the militants. “People talk about human rights violations in Kashmir but do not look upon the frequent use of mines, IEDs and grenades as a violation of human rights,” he asserted.

“Their use shows that militants are getting weaker and were being forced to use defensive tactics. But it also shows that the proxy war in Kashmir is far from over.”

Security experts point out that while a large number of mines had also been recovered, the militants were showing a greater dependence on IEDs, which are mostly concealed underground. The reason was simple: laying of mines or booby-traps which exploded with pressure was the easiest when the territory was in the control of the militants. This may have been the case with the LTTE subversives in Sri Lanka but not so with the militants in Jammu and Kashmir who have been increasingly adopting hit-and-run tactics and opting for softer targets.

On the flip side, police officers operating in the valley agree to the inherent disadvantages of IEDs and mines. The High Explosives (HEs) and detonators used for their fabrication may be ordnance products, but the Kashmiri militants seemed to have an unending supply. The January 26, 1995 attack on Governor, General K.V. Krishna Rao was one of the first occasions when an IED was used and that devise, investigations revealed had been planted 45 days prior to the incident. The maximum period for which Kashmiri militants have planted an IED is 181 days.

Generally, the militants are known to have been using these simple IEDs, fitted with timers, rather than using Program Timed Devices (PTD) which are set off with the help of a remote control and need a greater level of sophistication for operating. About two months ago, police officials in Kupwara encountered what was later described as a `booby-trapped’ militant. In fact it was the dead body of a militant which had been strapped with a powerful IED. It exploded when the body was dragged into the police station, injuring a few persons. The incident only exposed the uncertainties and the dangerous dimension that the IEDs have added to the war of attrition in Kashmir.