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Journalism of Courage
The most attractive part of the Indo-US nuclear deal for New Delhi, an India-specific exception to the American domestic non-proliferation law and the global nuclear regime, is exactly what makes it so hard to sell to the US Congress and the international community. India should not forget this central political fact and expect the entrenched non-non-proliferation lobbies in world capitals to roll over and play dead at the sight of the extraordinary nuclear pact between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
There is some concern in New Delhi that the Bush Administration, faced with resistance in the US Congress and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, might accept political compromises not in India8217;s interest. For example, in the draft that it circulated for approval by the NSG last month, the Bush Administration proposed both a modification of the current international rules that prohibit nuclear cooperation with India as well as an intent to persuade India to accept 8220;fullscope safeguards8221;. On the face of it, these objectives are irreconcilable. The Indo-US nuclear pact rests on the recognition that there are separate military and civilian nuclear programmes in India and only the latter would be placed under safeguards. The ambiguity may be a result of the American attempt to reassure the international community that the traditional non-proliferation rules are not being given up even as they are being loosened for India. The Bush Administration has also suggested it is open to new ideas from the US Congress so long as they are not deal-breakers.
