
Yevgeny Primakov kept his date with India and kept it short, sweet and businesslike. That in a nutshell conveys the scope and content of the Russian prime minister8217;s two-day visit and it is not necessary or wise to blow it up or play it down. The political significance of the trip lay in the fact that it took place, the first by a head of government of a member of the P-5 since Pokharan-II. Along with other weapons powers, Russia was party to formal resolutions, including one at the Security Council, criticising India for conducting nuclear tests last May. Russia was also one of a group, including China and Central Asian countries, which thought fit to express formal concern about the nuclear situation in South Asia. In that context, Primakov8217;s visit served to reaffirm the importance of the Indo-Russian relationship. Even so, it stopped short of signalling any desire to elevate the relationship to a new level.
The lack of exuberance is only partly a matter of style; unlike the extrovert, bear-hugging BorisYeltsin, Primakov8217;s manner is sober and somewhat bureaucratic. But there are more complex reasons behind the restraint. Russian policy on non-proliferation is a continuation of the Soviet Union8217;s. Regardless of Moscow8217;s differences with Washington over the means of furthering it, Russia can be expected to join the P-5 chorus in urging New Delhi to sign the NPT and CTBT. Furthermore, Moscow has an interest in strengthening ties across a wide front in Asia, with Japan, China, India and Asean, and it needs to keep its economic and political relations with the western world in good repair. So a delicate balance is what Russia8217;s foreign policy establishment will be seeking. This explains, incidentally, the backtracking on a Russian-Indian-Chinese axis which is, in any case, an absurd concept in an international context which calls for more multilateralism rather than the formation of blocs to counter the single superpower.