Musharraf is definitely not Arafat, he delivers when it’s needed

n What is likely to be the new message of the US Secretary of State Colin Powell on his forthcoming visit to South Asia?

Sometimes, messages do not need to be new. Pakistan needs to fulfil its commitments, and India needs to engage Pakistan in substantive dialogue.

What is the Bush administration’s new roadmap for the two neighbours?
A war is still quite possible. That’s why a US facilitation strategy is needed, one that aligns near-term objectives of a permanent cessation of infiltration across the LoC, demobilisation, and dismantling the infrastructure of jihad, with subsequent moves aimed at moving the parties closer toward a settlement.

How successful has President Musharraf been in controlling militancy within Pakistan and putting an end to cross-border terrorism? Is he proving to be a Yasser Arafat of the subcontinent?
President Musharraf is definitely not Arafat. He has proven able to stem infiltration across the LoC when the situation demands that he do so.

What do you think about Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani’s statement that he does not trust Musharraf.
Facts on the ground build trust, or erode it. Musharraf has made commitments that he needs to keep. If, however, the Government of India simply pockets positive steps without taking initiatives of its own, the situation on the ground will not improve over time.

Do you agree that Musharraf needs to bring about structural changes in the ISI, and the army, by purging the younger fundamentalist officers?
Musharraf has already made numerous personnel changes. The fundamental question is whether he understands just how injurious his Kashmir policy is — to Kashmiris as well as to Pakistan — and is therefore willing to switch gears. A related question is also asked in Washington: Does the Government of India understands how injurious its Kashmir policy is?

What is the solution to the core issues between the two neighbours, when and if the dialogue begins?
In recent congressional testimony, I said that I would grant Pakistan that Kashmir is a core issue. However, nuclear risk reduction, escalation control, and war avoidance are also core issues. The permanent end to infiltration abetted by the Pakistan Army and ISI are prerequisites to nuclear risk reduction, escalation control, and a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Another prerequisite is that map changes must be consensual. Militancy creates suffering, not solutions. A third prerequisite requires the Government of India to honour its constitutional pledge for genuine autonomy for J&K.

Do you agree that even if Kashmir is solved, the hostility between India and Pakistan is likely to continue?
True, but there is a considerable difference between a minor and a life-threatening illness. Unless the Kashmir issue is seriously addressed, it will remain a life-threatening illness for the region.

n Is the mobilisation at the border a hindrance to improving the ties between the neighbours?

It’s hard to normalise relations and to negotiate seriously on substantive issues when forces are in the field, ready to fight. Pakistan, as the weaker party, cannot and will not demobilise first. India can help this process — even before the elections in J& K — by taking steps to reduce the readiness of its strike forces along the border.

Is the US aiming to play the role of a mediator in South Asia?
The heavy lifting has to come from the region, but the US has now agreed to play the role of facilitator. It’s evident that, when two nuclear-armed adversaries engage in brinksmanship and refuse to talk to one another, or talk past one another, they could stand to benefit from outside help. If the Bush administration doesn’t do its job well, it’s hard to see how India and Pakistan can turn the corner. If, however, one or all of the parties believe that US facilitation is simply a means of pocketing what one wants without compromise, this, too, is a recipe for failure.