Make it an Asian century

In 1963, I was shifted as charge d’affairs. The following years constituted the Darkest Winter in our relations. I faced official cold-shouldering. During the 1965 war with Pakistan, I was regularly woken up at night and given time-bound ultimata, levelling fictitious charges, demonstrating China’s pro-Pakistan bias. When India was accused of aggression, I walked out of banquets, including on National Day when Mao was present.

My last visit was accompanying Atal Bihari Vajpayee when he was foreign minister in February 1979. It was a Tentative Spring. Soon after I took over as foreign secretary, Mrs Gandhi had approved the re-upgrading of our mission. K.R. Narayanan had taken charge as ambassador in July 1976. Relations improved steadily. Prior to Vajpayee’s visit it had been agreed to keep aside the boundary dispute but other contentious issues were resolved. China pledged not to give arms to the insurgents in the Northeast. We stood by our abiding friendship with the USSR. Vajpayee explained the constitutional developments in relation to Sikkim and for months China refrained from referring to Sikkim separately or objectionably to Kashmir. China’s attack on Vietnam occurred when Vajpayee was visiting Hangchow. The accidental timing symbolised Chinese insensitivity to Indian reactions.

Oscillations in these relations reflected mutual misperceptions. Given its anti-imperialist orientation, Nehru expected liberated Asia to cooperate and give priority to national development. In 1954, India had readily conceded that Tibet was a region of China and didn’t expect the differences on the border to explode the way they did. Communist China had appreciated India’s spokesmanship in the UN on Korea and Indo-China, but did not understand the working of India’s democratic parliamentary system.

It was no secret that Nehru had crusaded for trusting China and therefore it was an avoidable blunder to name him in the official comments on the revolt in Tibet in May 1959. Parliamentary and public opinion in India got so outraged that it put even Nehru on the defensive. In 1960 Nehru could not even agree to Chou-en-Lai’s six points, inter alia acknowledging, “that there existed a dispute”. He could not publicly note that China already exercised control over Aksai Chin. Nehru felt that builders of socialism could not be aggressive and so did not anticipate that the “Forward Policy” could be seen as provocative. The 1962 operations were not for territory but for political assertiveness.

The imperative now is the same with China as with Pakistan: To exorcise the legacy of the past. History cannot remain a roadblock to rational approaches for the future. On China, two notions prevail in India: Some argue the China-India crisis was largely due to India’s provocations and a border settlement would catalyse a political improvement. Others, mostly strategic thinkers, fear a repetition of 1962 and so urge India to refine its military capability and nuclear deterrence. I share neither the sense of India’s guilt nor of impending Armageddon. Though there is no de jure agreement for “mutual accommodation” exchanging Aksai Chin for Arunachal, my view is that unless we provide major provocation, military threat to India is not likely.

A major settlement requires a constitutional amendment and can only follow political consensus in India. China is already a near-superpower. The prime minister has wisely recognised that both countries have complementarity as well as healthy rivalry. It will so remain even if there is a border settlement. The challenge is between a short-wind democracy and a nation with a marathon capacity to pursue its perceived destiny.

The governments of India and China can now identify a new shared anxiety. The rise of internal disaffection, fed by the communication revolution, poses a threat to governments everywhere. What should be of special concern is the growth of religious extremism with suicidal motivation. Both China and India have a common interest in progress in the continent including stability in Pakistan. Both countries have an interest in international multipolarity. The US is the world economic engine but its uni-polarity is yet to succeed in Iraq. China and India have both enjoyed gains from globalisation but we also share the compulsion to make it equitable.

New beginnings in bilateral relations between India and China have timely logic. India’s finance minister underscored the balance of China’s industry with India’s capability in the service sector. Trade could double, specially if the land border’s reopened. But there must be caution against reverting to the old euphoria. If the 21st is to be an Asian century — as Deng prophesised — it will have to be a blend of beneficial bilateralism, constructive regionalism and enlightened internationalism.

(The writer is a former foreign secretary)