As the United Nations General Assembly convenes for its 80th session this week, there is a sinking sense that US President Donald Trump is bent on deconstructing the world’s premier multilateral forum. The UN survived his first-term onslaught (2017-21), widely seen then as an aberration in US policy. This time, Trump is more powerful, less constrained, and moving decisively to reduce the UN’s salience in the global order.
In his speech today, Trump is expected to pat himself on the back as a peacemaker, boasting of “ending seven wars” in the first eight months of his second term. For Indian audiences weary of that refrain, it is worth recalling that he is speaking, in part, to his populist base. One of the central themes of the America First movement has been opposition to “endless wars” and denunciation of liberals and Democrats as the “war party” squandering American blood and treasure. Trump promised to be a “peace president” in his January inaugural. But these boasts about peace cannot conceal the movement’s hostility to the UN. In Trump’s telling, he is doing a better job than the UN Security Council (UNSC), the body charged with maintaining international peace and security.
Trump’s approach to the UN signals a deeper shift in US foreign policy — a retreat from multilateralism toward unilateralism. His maiden UN speech in 2017 laid out the template. In a definitive repudiation of globalism, he framed national sovereignty as the “fundamental principle” of international relations. International cooperation, he said, was acceptable but never at the cost of national decision-making or prosperity. In Trump’s worldview, there is no room for the “supra-nationalism” that enthralled liberals after the Cold War.
Trump’s emphasis on sovereignty and his critique of intrusive liberal internationalism resonated with many developing countries, including India. But his 2017 speech also heralded a string of withdrawals and funding threats. In his first term, he left the Paris Climate Agreement, UNESCO, the Human Rights Council and the Iran nuclear deal. He threatened cuts to UN agencies and questioned the value of peacekeeping. The Biden administration reversed this approach. In the second term, Trump has doubled down — turning disruption into comprehensive policy.
The big difference now is an ideological playbook: The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025. The conservative manifesto brims with scepticism of internationalism. It calls for slashing US contributions to agencies seen as undermining sovereignty or promoting “radical social policies” such as gender equality and LGBTQ rights. It goes further than cutting funds, seeking to transform multilateral bodies into instruments of American policy and even floating the possibility of leaving the UN if it fails to align with administration objectives. UN policies supporting sustainable development or climate mitigation are a no-go for Trump.
Since January 2025, this agenda has been executed at remarkable speed. Washington has again withdrawn from the WHO, UNESCO and the Human Rights Council. Funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees has ceased. US support for the Paris Agreement and the new Climate Loss and Damage Fund has been halted. There has been an unprecedented cut of more than 80 per cent in US contributions to UN operations, including peacekeeping and global health.
As the American retreat creates a vacuum, China is poised to fill it. Beijing brings its own great-power ambition to the UN. It campaigns systematically to place its nationals in influential posts, not only in visible leadership but also in technical and administrative roles shaping standards, auditing and membership decisions. It sponsors development initiatives aligned with the Belt and Road and promotes “global development,” “global security,” “global civilisation” and “global governance” — concepts designed to buttress Chinese strategy for international leadership. Beijing still has some distance to go before supplanting US dominance of the UN and other multilateral institutions, yet its activism has already made it an indispensable actor — an outcome eased by US disengagement.
This new dynamic plays out against a broader fatigue with multilateralism. Around the turn of the millennium, the UN seemed at a high-water mark with the launch of the WTO and the Millennium Development Goals. Since then, populist nationalism, China’s rise and transatlantic divisions have eroded consensus. The UNSC is gridlocked by the US-China and US-Russia rivalries; even humanitarian issues are paralysed by competing vetoes. Trump has not caused this decline but has accelerated it. As the UN turns 80, it faces deep structural and political obstacles. Key agencies are in a financial crisis, voluntary contributions have plummeted, and calls for reform — especially UNSC expansion — remain blocked.
The real question is not simply whether the US or China will dominate the UN, but whether middle powers like India can help craft a multilateralism fit for an age of rivalry and rapid change. For India, the turbulence brings both risk and opportunity. The old tropes of its multilateralism — Security Council expansion or demands on the North across a wide range of issues — have little chance of advancing in the current circumstances. Delhi must instead focus on a few issues of high priority, such as global governance of AI, and build like-minded coalitions that cut across the North-South divide.
Above all, Delhi should put its money where its mouth is by raising its own financial contributions to the UN’s regular budget, which now stands at about $38 million — less than one per cent. In contrast, China contributes about $680 million (roughly 20 per cent), and the US leads with $820 million (about 22 per cent). Both powers also make large voluntary contributions to UN activities through specialised agencies. India, too, must raise its voluntary contributions to agencies whose work intersects with its national interests. As it pays more to the UN to match its position as the world’s fourth-largest economy, India should also pursue a broader agenda for reform of the UN system as a whole, not just UNSC expansion. Reducing bureaucratic flab, cutting through multiple inefficiencies and narrowing the organisation’s focus could make the UN a more effective instrument for the global majority.
Trump’s second-term assault on the UN highlights the fragility of the post-1945 multilateral order. China is yet to convince the world that a future multilateralism led by it would be a better alternative. India, which has long defined itself as a champion of the “Global South”, cannot simply lament this erosion. If Delhi wishes to shape the rules of a turbulent world, it must shoulder greater responsibilities in crafting a new multilateralism for an age when neither Washington nor Beijing commands universal legitimacy.
The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express
The real question is whether the US or China will dominate the UN, but whether middle powers like India can help craft a multilateralism fit for an age of rivalry and rapid change. 
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