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Journalism of Courage
The successful test firing of the long-range Agni III missile on Thursday marks the belated maturing of India8217;s atomic weapons programme and positions India to join the big league of nuclear great powers. Before we thump our chests and wrap the flag around the defence establishment, a few sobering thoughts are in order. They relate to the difficulties we have had in getting here and the new challenges that confront us in going beyond Agni III.
That it has taken our scientists nearly two decades since the first test of the Agni technology demonstrator system in 1989 is a reminder of the many limitations of our missile effort. The problems of organising technological development have been partly compounded by New Delhi8217;s political vacillation on testing the Agni during the 1990s.
Since the late 1980s, both China and Pakistan had surged far ahead of us in the missile field. In terms of types, numbers, mobility, range and accuracy, China today has a vastly superior missile arsenal than we do. And thanks to external assistance from China and North Korea during the 1990s, Pakistan too has a powerful and flexible missile capability.
The hype in the wake of Agni III that India now has the longest range missile in South Asia is best taken with a pinch of salt. The claim, of course, begs the question, so what? India8217;s Agni III, with its presumed range of over 3,000 km, does little to alter the nuclear balance with Pakistan. With its 8216;Shaheen8217; and 8216;Ghauri8217; medium range missiles, Islamabad has the capacity to target most major Indian cities. The truth is Pakistan does not need a 3,000 km range missile to deter India8217;s nuclear forces. Nor does India have much use for Agni III in its strategic calculus towards Pakistan.
India has long needed a longer range missile to deter the Chinese nuclear forces. Therein lies the strategic significance of Agni III. Since Beijing conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964, bridging the nuclear gap with China has been an important Indian national security objective.
India8217;s decision to conduct five nuclear tests in May 1998 and proclaim itself a nuclear weapon state did give it a sort of psychological equivalence in the strategic domain with Beijing. But in operational terms the Indian nuclear deterrent did not have a credible retaliatory capability against China. Its Prithvi missiles and the shorter range Agni I and II were not capable of giving India the much vaunted second strike capability against China.
Agni III should help India overcome that limitation, but only notionally at this moment. It would be a while before the Defence Research and Development Organisation DRDO proves the operational viability of Agni III. Since the first test of Agni III last July was a failure, and the centrality of the latest missile in India8217;s architecture of its nuclear delivery systems, the Armed Forces and the government must insist on repeated tests of the latest missile before inducting it into service.
The real challenges that the nation must deal after Agni III are more strategic rather than techno-military. Whether it is the size of the Agni III arsenal that India must build, or the mode of its deployment, or questions that demand political judgements, at the highest level, on what constitutes a credible second strike capability vis-a-vis China. Given the high political stakes built into the Agni III development, the government can no longer leave these decisions on strategy to any particular scientific enclave. Abandoning political responsibility for nuclear decisions in the past has come back to haunt New Delhi in recent years.
Many diplomatic challenges, too, need to be addressed in the wake of Agni III. Since the main political objective of Agni III is to acquire credible deterrence against Beijing, it would be unwise to ignore the prospect that China would modify its own nuclear posture to take into account India8217;s new strategic capabilities. Acquiring strategic parity with Beijing might, in retrospect, look a lot easier than managing its inevitable consequences. New Delhi8217;s failure to anticipate Beijing8217;s response after India8217;s first nuclear test in 1974 cost us dearly in terms of extended Chinese support to Pakistan8217;s nuclear and missile programmes.
India8217;s China challenge after Agni III involves a hard-headed pursuit of two seemingly contradictory imperatives. As China dramatically expands its own military space capabilities, underlined most recently by its testing of an anti-satellite weapon, India needs to keep pace. For one, New Delhi should stop believing its own propaganda on disarmament in outer space. Having claimed a success with its first missile defence test late last year, New Delhi must now shed its political ambivalence about pursuing the next generation military space technologies. For another, India needs to outline a coherent national military space strategy, modernise its armed forces, and integrate them more effectively with the existing and planned space and missile assets.
As it prepares to match Chinese missile and space capabilities, India has an additional reason to more intensively engage Beijing. It is in India8217;s self-interest to pre-empt many possible misperceptions in Beijing. India8217;s relations with China have never been as good as they are today. That does not mean, India would accept a permanent strategic inferiority vis-a-vis China. Acquiring parity, however, does not imply India would want to invite renewed tensions with China. Finding that balance with China, after Agni III, is the real test for India8217;s national security strategy.
The writer is a professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
